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Lawful Hacking:
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By Steven M. Bellovin*, Matt Blaze †, Sandy Clark§, & Susan Landau‡
For years, legal wiretapping was straightforward: the officer doing the intercept
connected a tape recorder or the like to a single pair of wires. By the 1990s, however, the
changing structure of telecommunications—there was no longer just “Ma Bell” to talk
to—and new technologies such as ISDN and cellular telephony made executing a wiretap
more complicated for law enforcement. Simple technologies would no longer suffice. In
response, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA) 1, which mandated a standardized lawful intercept interface on all local phone
switches. Since its passage, technology has continued to progress, and in the face of new
forms of communication—Skype, voice chat during multiplayer online games, instant
messaging, etc.—law enforcement is again experiencing problems. The FBI has called
this “Going Dark”: their loss of access to suspects’ communication. 2 According to news
reports, law enforcement wants changes to the wiretap laws to require a CALEA-like
interface in Internet software. 3
CALEA, though, has its own issues: it is complex software specifically intended to create
a security hole—eavesdropping capability—in the already-complex environment of a
phone switch. It has unfortunately made wiretapping easier for everyone, not just law
enforcement. Congress failed to heed experts’ warnings of the danger posed by this
mandated vulnerability, and time has proven the experts right. The so-called “Athens
Affair,” where someone used the built-in lawful intercept mechanism to listen to the cell
phone calls of high Greek officials, including the Prime Minister, 4 is but one example. In
an earlier work, we showed why extending CALEA to the Internet would create very
serious problems, including the security problems it has visited on the phone system. 5
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In this paper, we explore the viability and implications of an alternative method for
addressing law enforcements need to access communications: legalized hacking of target
devices through existing vulnerabilities in end-user software and platforms. The FBI
already uses this approach on a small scale; we expect that its use will increase,
especially as centralized wiretapping capabilities become less viable.
Relying on vulnerabilities and hacking poses a large set of legal and policy questions,
some practical and some normative. Among these are:
(1) Will it create disincentives to patching?
(2) Will there be a negative effect on innovation? (Lessons from the so-called
“Crypto Wars” of the 1990s, and in particular the debate over export
controls on cryptography, are instructive here.)
(3) Will law enforcement’s participation in vulnerabilities purchasing skew the
market?
(4) Do local and even state law enforcement agencies have the technical
sophistication to develop and use exploits? If not, how should this be
handled? A larger FBI role?
(5) Should law enforcement even be participating in a market where many of the
sellers and other buyers are themselves criminals?
(6) What happens if these tools are captured and repurposed by miscreants?
(7) Should we sanction otherwise illegal network activity to aid law
enforcement?
(8) Is the probability of success from such an approach too low for it to be
useful?
As we will show, these issues are indeed challenging. We regard the issues raised by
using vulnerabilities as, on balance, preferable to adding more complexity and insecurity
to online systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

For several years, the FBI has warned that newer communications technologies
have hindered its ability to conduct electronic surveillance. 6 Valerie Caproni, General
Counsel of the FBI, said in Congressional testimony:
6

See, e.g., Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies, supra note 2
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Methods of accessing communications networks have similarly grown in variety
and complexity. Recent innovations in hand-held devices have changed the ways
in which consumers access networks and network-based services. One result of
this change is a transformation of communications services from a straightforward relationship between a customer and a single CALEA-covered provider
(e.g. customer to telephone company) to a complex environment in which a
customer may use several access methods to maintain simultaneous interactions
with multiple providers, some of whom may be based overseas or are otherwise
outside the scope of CALEA.
As a result, although the government may obtain a court order authorizing the
collection of certain communications, it often serves that order on a provider who
does not have an obligation under CALEA to be prepared to execute it. 7

¶2
¶3

¶4

The FBI’s solution is “legislation that will assure that when we get the appropriate
court order . . . companies . . . served . . . have the capability and the capacity to respond.” 8
While on the one hand this request is predictable given past precedent, it is rather
remarkable given current national cybersecurity concerns and in light of stark evidence of
the significant harm caused by CALEA. The request to expand CALEA to IP-based
communications places the needs of the Electronic Surveillance Unit above all else,
including the security risks that arise when building wiretapping capabilities into
communications infrastructure and applications, other government agencies who face
increased risk from hackers and nation states who may exploit this new vulnerability, and
the national need for innovation which drives economic prosperity. Rather than examine
the issue in terms of social good—which the FBI already does each time it prioritizes
certain types of investigations (terrorism cases, drug cases, etc.) or decides whether to
conduct a particular investigation—the FBI has thrown down a gauntlet that ignores longterm national interest.
The FBI’s preferred solution—“requiring that social-networking Web sites and
providers of VoIP, instant messaging, and Web e-mail alter their code to ensure their
products are wiretap-friendly” 9—will create security risks in our already-fragile Internet
infrastructure, leaving the nation more vulnerable to espionage and our critical
infrastructure more open to attack, and hinder innovation. 10 Securing communications
infrastructure is a national priority. By weakening communications infrastructure and
(prepared statement of Valerie Caproni, General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation). The FBI is the
law-enforcement agency with the greatest role for setting policy on wiretapping.
7
Id. at 14.
8
See Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Congress (2012) (statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation); see
also Declan McCullagh, FBI 'Looking at' Law Making Web Sites Wiretap-Ready, Director Says, CNET
(May 18, 2012, 1:17 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57437391-83/fbi-looking-at-law-makingweb-sites-wiretap-ready-director-says/.
9
Declan McCullagh, FBI: We Need Wiretap-Ready Web Sites—Now, CNET (May 4, 2012, 9:34 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57428067-83/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sites-now/.
10
Sometimes, such a solution directly benefits the U.S. military. One NSA program—Commercial
Solutions for Classified—uses products from government research “layered” with private-sector products
to produce communication tools with high security. See Fred Roeper & Neal Ziring, Presentation at RSA
Conference 2012, Building Robust Security Solutions Using Layering and Independence 2–6 (2012),
available at http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/star-401.pdf. However, this
protection does not extend to the vast majority of civilian computers.
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applications, the FBI’s proposal would mostly give aid to the enemy. Surely that is
neither what the FBI intends nor what sound national priorities dictate.
The problem is created by technology. Over the course of the last three decades, we
have moved from a circuit-switched centralized communications network—the Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)—run by a monopoly provider, to a circuitswitched centralized communications network run by multiple providers, to an InternetProtocol (IP) based decentralized network run by thousands of providers. The first
change, from the monopoly provider to multiple providers, gave rise to the need for the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). This simplified law
enforcement’s efforts to manage wiretaps with multiple, though relatively few, providers.
However, in certain situations, such as when peer-to-peer communications or
communications encrypted end-to-end are used, legally authorized wiretaps may be
impeded. Even if law enforcement does not currently have a serious problem in
conducting authorized wiretaps, with time it will. Thus, there is a serious question of
what is to be done. In proposing controls on peer-to-peer networks and on the use of
encryption, 11 the FBI has floated highly flawed solutions. 12
We propose an alternative to the FBI’s proposal: Instead of building wiretapping
capabilities into communications infrastructure and applications, government wiretappers
can behave like the bad guys. That is, they can exploit the rich supply of security
vulnerabilities already existing in virtually every operating system and application to
obtain access to communications of the targets of wiretap orders. 13
We are not advocating the creation of new security holes, 14 but rather observing
that exploiting those that already exist represents a viable—and significantly better—
alternative to the FBI’s proposals for mandating infrastructure insecurity. Put simply, the
choice is between formalizing (and thereby constraining) the ability of law enforcement
to occasionally use existing security vulnerabilities—something the FBI and other law
enforcement agencies already do when necessary without much public or legal scrutiny—
or living with those vulnerabilities and intentionally and systematically creating a set of
predictable new vulnerabilities that despite best efforts will be exploitable by everyone.
Using vulnerabilities to create exploits and wiretap targets, however, raises ethical
issues. Once an exploit for a particular security vulnerability leaves the lab, it may be
used for other purposes and cause great damage. Any proposal to use vulnerabilities to
enable wiretaps must minimize such risks.
In a previous work, we discussed the technical feasibility of relying on the
vulnerability approach; 15 here we focus on the legal and policy issues posed by this
11

A1.

See Charlie Savage, U.S. is Working to Ease Wiretaps on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at

Id. Six months after the New York Times reported the FBI was seeking additional capabilities for
Internet wiretapping, FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni testified, “Congressman, the Administration is
still working on what the solution would be, and we hope to have something that we can work with
Congress on in the near future.” See Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New
Technologies, supra note 2, at 40. As of this writing, no bill has been proposed.
13
See Bellovin, Blaze, Clark & Landau, supra note 5, at 62–63.
14
That is far from the case. Some of the authors have devoted much of their professional careers to
preventing or coping with security holes and the problems they cause.
15
See Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, & Landau, supra note 5, at 66–68.
12
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approach. In particular, we examine the tension between the use of naturally occurring
software vulnerabilities to legitimately aid law enforcement investigations and the abuse
of the same vulnerabilities by criminals. We propose that law enforcement adopt strict
guidelines requiring immediate disclosure to the vendor any vulnerabilities as soon they
are discovered. As we will discuss, such guidelines would allow law enforcement to fully
support crime prevention, and—because of the natural lag of the software lifecycle—still
allow law enforcement to build a sufficiently rich toolkit to conduct investigations
in practice.
¶10
The discussion in this paper is limited to use of vulnerabilities for communications
intercepts, rather than generic “remote search.” While the two concepts have much in
common, including the use of vulnerabilities to achieve access, there are distinct
differences in both the technical and legal aspects. 16
¶11
Section II first discusses how CALEA fit into the communications environment at
the time, and then its disjunction with newly evolving communication systems. We then
examine the reasons for and risks of extending CALEA to IP-based communications. The
continued existence of vulnerabilities, fundamental to our proposal, is discussed in
Section III. In Section IV, we discuss their use for wiretapping. Using exploits to enable
wiretapping raises a number of troubling questions. As the Stuxnet cyberattack amply
demonstrates, even carefully tailored exploits can extend past their intended target. 17
Therefore, law enforcement’s use of vulnerabilities requires careful consideration of how
to limit the proliferation, which we discuss in Section V. Section VI considers whether
law enforcement use of vulnerabilities should influence norms around vulnerability
reporting. In Section VII, we discuss how to implement vulnerability reporting. We
conclude our argument in Section VIII.
II. CALEA: THE CHANGE IN WIRETAP ARCHITECTURE
¶12

The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) was born of
a certain time and certain place. It was a law created with the expectation of multiple, but
relatively few, communications providers, and of a telephone network not substantially
removed from the world of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) of the 1950s
to 1980s. It was anticipated that both the technical and business structure of
communications networks would remain centralized. The impact of the more
fundamental changes that were percolating at the time of CALEA’s passage—IP-based
communications and enormous numbers of services—were not anticipated at the time. In
this section, we discuss the problems CALEA was intended to address and those it was
16
“Remote search” is the capability to search the contents of a computer’s files via a surreptitious
Internet connection. The investigator obtains access, presumably by hacking in, and runs assorted
programs; in contrast, more usual searches involve seizing the computer and bringing it to a forensics lab.
See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Fourth Amendment Future: Remote Computer Searches and the Use of Virtual
Force, 81 MISS. L.J. 1229, available at http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/2011%20Symposium/14%20Brenner_FINAL.pdf; EU to Search Out Cyber Criminals, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7758127.stm (last updated Dec. 1, 2008).
17
See generally Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, & Eric Chien, W.32 Stuxnet Dossier, SYMANTEC
(Feb. 2011),
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dos
sier.pdf [hereinafter Stuxnet Dossier]. Stuxnet was apparently developed and launched by intelligence or
cyberwarfare agencies; as such, its design is likely quite different from a law enforcement exploit.
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not intended to address, briefly mention the security risks created by these solutions,18
and the patchwork of solutions that have emerged to cover IP-based voice
communications. We conclude by describing the impact of these changes on wiretapping
and CALEA.
A. History of CALEA
¶13

CALEA had its roots in the nascent switch to digital transport of voice over the
phone network’s local loops in the early 1990s. ISDN was touted as the next wave of
telephony, since it could provide what was, for the time, very high-speed data over a
switched line. 19 For all ISDN’s advantages, however, it was not possible to tap ISDN
lines with the traditional “two alligator clips and a tape recorder.” 20 Furthermore, cellular
telephony was growing rapidly; because the communication was wireless and mobile,
cellular communications also could not be tapped with two alligator clips and a tape
recorder. While specialized interception gear could have been developed, the FBI instead
proposed in 1992 what was originally known as the Digital Telephony Bill, a
standardized interface for wiretaps. 21 The bill was opposed by the telecommunications
industry and civil-liberties organizations. 22 After considerable debate over the scope of
coverage, 23 the current form of CALEA was passed, specifically excluding “information
services.” 24
Many countries around the world have similar laws. See, e.g., Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act,
2000 c. 23, § 12 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/part/I/chapter/I/crossheading/interception-capability-andcosts. Our comments apply equally to all such laws.
19
ISDN—Integrated Services Digital Network—was defined in Maurizio Dècina & Eric L. Scace,
CCITT Recommendations on the ISDN: A Review, 4 IEEE J. ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMS. 320, 320–25
(1986). In its most common form, it provided so-called 2B+D service: two 64 Kbps “bearer” channels, and
a 16 Kbps data channel for signaling, e.g., call setup and teardown. Id. The two bearer channels could be
combined into a single 128 Kbps link for pure data; this is more than twice as fast as any single-line analog
phone modem can ever provide. For a variety of reasons, it never caught on in the United States as a
common service.
20
In the analog telephony era, wiretapping was very straightforward. It was almost as easy as plugging
in a new extension phone, though some additional circuitry was needed or the target was not able to dial
new calls or even hang up on a call. A law enforcement agent literally connected a pair of wires to the
phone line going to the suspect’s location; this connection could be done in the phone company’s central
office, at any point along the phone cable from the central office to the target, or, in the case of multiple
occupancy buildings, in some utility space in the building. When the phone company started running digital
signals to neighborhoods via “Subscriber Loop Carriers” (see, e.g., Voyager[TNO], The Subscriber Loop
Carrier (Slick), PHRACK 8:52, Jan. 26, 1998 at article 11,
http://www.phrack.com/issues.html?issue=52&id=11), the tap could be done in the same way, albeit from
the neighborhood Remote Terminal onwards. Generally, a “loop extender” is employed to route the
intercepted conversations back to a suitable facility. See Micah Sherr, Eric Cronin, Sandy Clark & Matt
Blaze, Signaling Vulnerabilities in Wiretapping Systems, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Nov./Dec. 2005, at
13 vol. 3, no. 6 (2005): 13–25, http://www.crypto.com/papers/wiretap.pdf.
21
File 1—May ’92 Version of FBI Digital Telephony Proposal, COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIG. (July 5,
1992), http://cu-digest.org/CUDS4/cud429.txt; see also WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON
THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 205–06 (Updated & Expanded ed. 2007).
22
See, e.g., Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1994,
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/magazine/battle-of-the-clipper-chip.html.
23
In 1992, the FBI proposed legislation that would have “allowed the technical design mandates on any
provider of any electronic communications, including the Internet.” Corrected Petition for Rehearing En
Banc at 12, Am. Council on Educ. v FCC, No. 15-0504 (D.C. Cir. July 28, 2006), available at
18
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CALEA was intended to apply only to telephony. More precisely, CALEA was
intended to apply only to “local exchange service,” i.e., local phone service but not long
distance carriers. 25 Then-FBI Director Louis Freeh made clear in his 1994 Congressional
testimony that the Internet was not covered:
Mr. FREEH. . . . We are really talking about phone-to-phone conversations
which travel over a telecommunications network in whole or part. That is the
arena of criminal opportunity that we are discussing.
Senator PRESSLER. What other portions of the information superhighway could
people communicate with the new technology that there is not now a means of
listening in or following?
Mr. FREEH. From what I understand, and again, I am probably the worst person
in this room to answer the question, communications between private computers,
PC-PC communications, not utilizing a telecommunications common net, would
be one vast arena, the Internet system, many of the private communications
systems which are evolving. Those we are not going to be on by the design of
this legislation.
Senator PRESSLER. Are you seeking to be able to access those communications
also in some other legislation?
Mr. FREEH. No, we are not. We are satisfied with this bill. I think it delimits the
most important area and also makes for the consensus, which I think it pretty
much has at this point. 26

¶15

This consensus was reflected in the law, which defined a “telecommunications
carrier” to include “a person or entity engaged in providing wire or electronic
communication switching or transmission service to the extent that the Commission finds
that such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of the local telephone
exchange service and that it is in the public interest to deem such a person or entity to be
a telecommunications carrier for purposes of this subchapter.” 27
¶16
More recently, CALEA coverage has been extended to “last mile” service: the link
between a residence or business and its ISP. Although controversial because of Freeh’s
testimony and the exclusion of information services in CALEA, the FCC and the courts
have held that this class of link is not included in the information services exclusion.28

https://www.cdt.org/wiretap/calea/20060731calearehearing.pdf. The proposal was “rejected out of hand”.
Id. (quoting Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access to Advanced Telecommunications
Technologies and Services: J. Hearings on H.R. 4922 and S. 2375 Before the Subcomm. on Tech. and the
Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary & Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 49 (1994)).
24
47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(C)(i) (2006).
25
Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access to Advanced Telecommunications Technologies and
Services, supra note 23, at 136.
26
Id. at 202.
27
See 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(B)(ii) (2006).
28
Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 230 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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More precisely, the FCC made that ruling, and, relying on Chevron deference, the Court
of Appeals upheld the FCC’s ruling. 29
¶17
Though important, this change to CALEA is of less concern to law enforcement
than is the fate of the traditional telephone network. It is going away, and far faster than
anyone had forecast. Already, more than 35% of American households do not have
landline phone service, and about 16% more who have landlines never or almost never
receive calls on them. 30 Indeed, the working assumption in the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) is that the PSTN will effectively cease to exist by 2018. 31
B. Wiretap Consequences of Splitting Services and Infrastructure
¶18

It might be tempting to say that the coming end of the PSTN vindicates the FBI’s
vision when it proposed CALEA. The actual situation, though, is far more complex; the
decoupling of services from the physical link has destroyed the chokepoint at which
CALEA could be applied. This does not appear to have been anticipated at the time of
CALEA’s passage.
¶19
A paradigmatic case in which the decoupling presents serious wiretapping
problems is when communication occurs through use of Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP). A VoIP phone provider can be located far from its subscribers; indeed, it could
be in another, possibly unfriendly, country. Furthermore, the “signaling path”—the set of
links that carry the call setup messages—can differ from the “voice path”—the links that
carry the actual conversation. 32 (Tapping the last mile connection is likely fruitless, since
VoIP connections are often encrypted.)
¶20
This is best explained by a diagram. Figure 1 shows a plausible setup for a VoIP
call from Alice to Bob. 33 Alice’s and Bob’s phones are each connected to their own ISPs,
Net 1 and Net 4. They each subscribe to their own VoIP provider, which in turn is
connected to their ISPs. The signaling messages—that is, the messages used to set up the
call, indicate ringing, etc.—go from Alice’s phone, through her ISP to VoIP Provider 1’s
ISP, to her phone company. It then contacts VoIP Provider 2, via its ISP; VoIP Provider 2
sends a message through Net 4 to Bob’s phone. The actual voice path, however, goes
directly from Net 1 to Net 4; neither Net 2, Net 3, nor the VoIP providers even carry the
actual conversation. As noted, any or all of the messages may be encrypted.

29
See id. at 231 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984)).
30
STEPHEN J. BLUMBERG & JULIAN V. LUKE, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, WIRELESS
SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY,
JANUARY-JUNE 2012 1 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201212.pdf.
31
TECHNICAL ADVISORY COUNCIL, FEDERAL COMMS. COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF MEETING (Sept. 27,
2011), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/oet/tac/tacdocs/tac-meeting-summary-9-27-11-final.docx.
32
See STEVEN BELLOVIN, MATT BLAZE, ERNEST BRICKELL, CLINTON BROOKS, VINTON CERF,
WHITFIELD DIFFIE, SUSAN LANDAU, JON PETERSON & JOHN TREICHLER, SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
APPLYING THE COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT TO VOICE OVER IP 2–7 (2006),
available at https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/CALEAVOIPreport.pdf (demonstrating a VoIP
network in Figure 1 on pg. 4).
33
This figure is adapted from id. at 4.
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¶21

In this setup, where can a tap be placed? On any of the ISPs? Law enforcement has
no a priori information where Alice and Bob will be—their current IP addresses—prior to
their setting up a call, so law enforcement cannot serve the ISPs with a wiretap order. To
make matters worse, the ISPs have nothing to do with the VoIP call, nor can they read the
encrypted traffic. How about at one of the VoIP providers? They do not see the voice
traffic. And, of course, they may be in a different jurisdiction (for example, Skype was
originally hosted in Luxembourg). This is a scenario that has no points amenable to a
CALEA-like solution.
¶22
Other services are more complex still. Consider the new phone service being
offered by Republic Wireless, which uses a combination of IP and PSTN networks to
make a call. The service is intended to operate primarily over WiFi networks and the
Internet; however, it can switch to Sprint’s 3G cellular network as needed. 34 Where could
a CALEA tap be placed? A tap could certainly be placed on the Internet-facing side of
Republic’s facilities, 35 but that would miss Sprint calls. Conversely, there could be one
on Sprint’s network, but that would miss calls made via VoIP. It is of course possible to
place taps on both networks, but the protocols are very different. Since the ordinary
signaling mechanisms are not used, special code would be needed to hand off not the call
and the information necessary to carry out the tap. 36 Pen registers would be even more
involved because the types of information easily recorded—phone numbers versus IP
addresses—would vary.
¶23
Apart from reasonably straightforward (though structurally different) PSTN
replacements, a large variety of other communications schemes have gained popularity.
Email and text messages are two obvious examples, though even these pose challenges
for law enforcement due to issues of personal jurisdiction and lack of real-time access to
content. Skype is perhaps the most extreme case. Its architecture, which an FCC report
calls “over the top,” 37 has no central switches. Even apart from questions of jurisdiction,
there are no locations where a CALEA-style interface could be provided. Everything is
done peer-to-peer; ordinary Skype users forward signaling traffic for each other. 38
34
Walt Mossberg, For $19, an Unlimited Phone Plan, Some Flaws, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2013,
http://allthingsd.com/20130219/for-19-an-unlimited-phone-plan-some-flaws/.
35
Tapping the customer’s own Internet connection would not suffice, since the customer is likely to use
multiple WiFi networks that such a tap would miss. Also, while Republic Wireless is a U.S. company, there
is no reason why a similar service could not be offered by an offshore company over which U.S. courts
have no jurisdiction.
36
As of this writing, the Republic Wireless network cannot do handoffs of an in-progress call from a
WiFi network to Sprint or vice-versa. According to Mossberg, supra note 34, that feature is planned for the
near future.
37
CRITICAL LEGACY TRANSITION WORKING GROUP, SUN-SETTING THE PSTN (2011), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/oet/tac/tacdocs/meeting92711/Sun-Setting_the_PSTN_Paper_V03.docx.
38
It is unclear how true this still is. Skype has long used a “supernode,” a well-connected user computer
that carries considerably more traffic. Of late, Microsoft—the current owner of Skype—has been deploying
dedicated supernodes in its own data centers. See Dan Goodin, Skype Replaces P2P Supernodes with Linux
Boxes Hosted by Microsoft (Updated), ARS TECHNICA (May 1, 2012, 12:23 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/05/skype-replaces-p2p-supernodes-with-linux-boxes-hosted-bymicrosoft/. There have been some allegations that the replacement was done precisely to permit
surveillance. See, e.g., John D. Sutter, Can Skype 'Wiretap' Video Calls?, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/24/tech/web/skype-surveillance (last updated July 24, 2012, 4:30 PM).
However, these are disputed by Mary Branscombe, who insists the changes in architecture are about
“improving performance and not appropriating bandwidth.” Forget the Conspiracy Theories: Skype's
Supernodes Belong in the Cloud, ZDNET (July 27, 2012, 1:52 PM), available at
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Because of this, there are no trusted elements that could serve as wiretap nodes, at least
for pen register orders. Furthermore, calls are always encrypted end-to-end. 39
¶24
It is useful to contrast the Skype architecture with the conventional client-server
architecture shown in Figure 1. In the conventional configuration, the VoIP providers run
servers to which the individual phones—the clients—connect. These are architecturally
different roles; when setting up calls, phones talk only to their associated servers and the
servers talk to the clients and to each other. It is not possible for Alice’s phone to contact
VoIP Provider 2 directly; they have no business relationship, and therefore cannot set up
a direct network link. 40 In a peer-to-peer setup such as that used by Skype, there are no
servers, i.e., no architecturally distinguished roles. 41 Rather, every computer or device
running a Skype client can participate in the signaling. Alice’s phone (somehow) finds
another Skype client and asks it to connect to Bob. This node finds another, which finds
another, etc., until Bob’s phone is located. 42 At that point, Alice’s and Bob’s phones
exchange signaling messages and set up the voice path. This voice path is in principle
direct, though for various reasons, including the existence of firewalls, other Skype nodes
may relay the (encrypted) voice packets. The lack of central servers, other than for user
registration and enhanced services such as calling out to PSTN numbers, dramatically
cuts the operational costs and allows Skype to offer free or extremely cheap
phone calls. 43
¶25
All that said, one of Snowden’s revelations was that the NSA can indeed intercept
Skype calls. 44 No technical details have been disclosed; all we know is that the NSA can
http://www.zdnet.com/forget-the-conspiracy-theories-skypes-supernodes-belong-in-the-cloud7000001720/. The one-time principal architect of Skype, Matthew Kaufman, has explained that the change
was done to accommodate the switch from always-on desktops to battery-powered mobile devices. See
Zack Whittaker, Skype Ditched Peer-to-Peer Supernodes for Scalability, not Surveillance, ZDNET (June
24, 2013, 4:02 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/skype-ditched-peer-to-peer-supernodes-for-scalability-notsurveillance-7000017215/. Microsoft has applied for a patent on mechanisms for eavesdropping on VoIP
networks, and some commentators have alleged that this technology will be incorporated into Skype. See,
e.g., Jaikumar Vijayan, Microsoft Seeks Patent for Spy Tech for Skype, COMPUTERWORLD (June 28, 2011,
5:06 PM),
https://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9218002/Microsoft_seeks_patent_for_spy_tech_for_Skype.
39
For a good, albeit dated—and paid for by Skype—review of the encryption architecture, see TOM
BERSON, ANAGRAM LABS., SKYPE SECURITY EVALUATION (Oct. 18, 2005),
http://www.anagram.com/berson/abskyeval.html.
40
This is not a technical limitation per se; however, VoIP Provider 2 knows nothing of Alice’s phone,
and hence is not willing to believe any assertions about its phone number, the person who uses it, etc. More
importantly, because of the lack of a business relationship, it will not provide service to Alice’s phone since
it will not be paid for its efforts.
41
This is not strictly true. The Skype servers, however, are involved only in registering new users and
providing them with cryptographic credentials. They are not involved in call setup, let alone being in the
voice path. See What Are P2P Communications?, SKYPE, https://support.skype.com/en/faq/fa10983/whatare-p2p-communications (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
42
How the call eventually reaches Bob’s phone is a rather complex technical matter, and not relevant
here. Let it suffice to say that Skype nodes regularly exchange enough navigational messages that it can
be done.
43
The lack of central servers was a deliberate architectural choice, designed to evade legal constraints.
Architecturally, Skype was based on the Kazaa file-sharing network, which was in turn designed to operate
without vulnerable nodes that could be targeted by copyright infringement lawsuits. For information about
the history and technology of Skype, see generally Doug Aamoth, A Brief History of Skype, Time (May 10,
2011), http://techland.time.com/2011/05/10/a-brief-history-of-skype/.
44
See Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, Laura Poitras, Spencer Ackerman & Dominic Rushe,
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intercept audio and video, with complete metadata. It remains unclear if the solution is
one that is usable by ordinary law enforcement, or if it relies on techniques (such as
advanced cryptanalysis) that rely on the intelligence community’s capabilities. 45
¶26
Text messaging has also changed. Originally, it was a simple protocol for mobile
phones. Recently, a number of variant implementations have been developed. Some
provide a better experience in some fashion (for example, Apple’s iMessage will send
copies of inbound messages to all of a user’s devices, including tablets and Mac
computers as well as phones); others do things like provide phone-like text messaging for
non-phone devices such as tablets. 46
¶27
Non-traditional text messaging applications have already proven problematic.
According to one report, attributed to a Drug Enforcement Administration memo, the
encryption used by Apple’s iMessage has already stymied wiretap orders. 47 There are
even instant messaging applications designed not just to encrypt traffic, but to provide
“repudiation,” the ability to deny that you sent certain traffic. 48
¶28
Further, many non-obvious communications mechanisms can serve for direct
communications as well. In one well-known case, General David Petraeus and Paula
Broadwell sent each other messages by creating and saving draft email messages in a
shared Gmail account. 49 Additionally, many multiplayer games include text or even realtime voice communications between players; while nominally intended to lend realism to
the game—soldiers in the same unit in action games can talk to each other and fighters on
Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted Messages, THE GUARDIAN, July 11, 2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data/print.
45
Microsoft claims that in 2012 it produced “no content” to law enforcement from Skype calls. See Brad
Smith, Microsoft Releases 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Mar. 21,
2013, 6:00 AM), https://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2013/03/21/microsoftreleases-2012-law enforcement-requests-report.aspx. The reports themselves are available at Law
Enforcement Requests Report, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/enus/reporting/transparency/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
46
There are many such applications currently available and new ones are constantly appearing. See, e.g.,
Tanya Menoni, 6 Free iPhone & iPod Touch Texting Apps, ABOUT.COM,
http://ipod.about.com/od/iphoneappsreviews/tp/4-Ways-To-Text-With-The-Ipod-Touch.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2013).
47
See Declan McCullagh & Jennifer Van Grove, Apple's iMessage Encryption Trips up Feds'
Surveillance, CNET NEWS (Apr. 4, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-5757788738/apples-imessage-encryption-trips-up-feds-surveillance/. Because the design of the protocol has not been
published, it has not been possible for outside experts to assess this claim. Some have asserted, based on
certain externally visible characteristics (like the ability to do a password reset and still see old messages),
that the messages must be stored unencrypted on Apple’s servers. See, e.g., Julian Sanchez, Untappable
Apple or DEA Disinformation?, CATO INSTITUTE (Apr. 4, 2013, 5:24 PM),
http://www.cato.org/blog/untappable-apple-or-dea-disinformation. If that is true, a court order under the
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006), would provide law enforcement with the
content, albeit perhaps not in real-time.
48
See Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg & Eric Brewer, Off-the-Record Communication, or, Why Not to Use
PGP, PROC. 2004 ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY ELECTRONIC SOC’Y 77, 77–78 (2004). Note that
“repudiation” (derived from its more cryptographic common counterpart, “nonrepudiation”) is used here as
a computer scientist would use it—it refers to certain cryptographic properties: in terms of the encryption
mechanisms used, it is not possible to show mathematically that a given person has sent certain messages.
Concepts that a lawyer might rely on, e.g., circumstantial evidence or eyewitness testimony to the contrary,
are not part of this mathematical model. Software to add repudiation to several IM programs is available at
https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/.
49
See Max Fisher, Here’s the E-Mail Trick Petraeus and Broadwell Used to Communicate, WASH.
POST, Nov. 12, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/12/heres-the-e-mailtrick-petraeus-and-broadwell-used-to-communicate/.
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opposing sides can yell challenges or insults—such applications can also be used for
surreptitious communications. Given that the Internet is a communications network, this
raises the specter that all programs can be considered communications systems.
C. New Technologies: Going Dark or Going Bright?
¶29

Collectively, the changes in telephony, the rise of new communications technology,
and (to some extent) the increasing use of encryption, have been called the “Going Dark”
problem because law enforcement has been unable to keep up with these changes and is
losing access to criminals’ communications. Technology works both ways, however;
others have rightly claimed that modern developments have actually increased the
practical ability of law enforcement to monitor criminals’ behavior via assorted forms of
metadata analysis; these analyses do not require warrants 50 So, how serious is the Going
Dark problem? How has the balance changed?
¶30
A firm, quantitative answer to the former question is probably not possible. We
cannot determine how many tap attempts would fail because law enforcement has said
that it does not seek wiretap orders for calls it cannot intercept. 51 Furthermore, the
situation is not static since both criminals and police adapt their tactics in response to
each other’s capabilities and tactics. Consider cellular telephony. Under the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO)
reports annually on all Title III wiretaps. 52 The reports include the offense under
investigation, the names of the prosecuting attorney and authorizing judge, the number of
intercepts conducted and number of incriminating intercepts, the cost of the surveillance,
etc. 53 In 2000, the report began listing how many wiretaps were of portable devices; in
that year, they comprised 719 out of a total 1,190 Title III wiretaps. 54 By 2009, it was
2,276 out of 2,376, or 96%. 55 This, of course, mirrors the trend of society as a whole; as
noted, a majority of Americans rely on mobile phones for most of their incoming calls. 56
¶31
Reliance on mobile phones provides a partial answer to the question of gaining and
losing capabilities as a result of modern communication systems. Because mobile phones
are far more likely to capture the target’s conversations—rather than those of a spouse or
business associate—mobile phone taps are more valuable than wireline taps.
Furthermore, mobile data can include information on a person’s location, which means
The claim is that the existence and availability of other information, such as location data, commercial
data dossiers, and readily available contact information has given law enforcement far more than
technology has taken away. See, e.g., SUSAN LANDAU, SURVEILLANCE OR SECURITY: THE RISKS POSED BY
NEW WIRETAPPING TECHNOLOGIES, 99–101 (2011), and Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and
Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 463–64 (2012).
51
Personal comments to Susan Landau; see also Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the
Face of New Technologies, supra note 2, at 12 (prepared statement of Valerie Caproni, General Counsel,
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
52
The reports are available at Wiretap Reports Archive, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/WiretapReports/WiretapReports_Archive.aspx (last visited Feb. 25,
2013).
53
See the list of text and appendix tables in, for example, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2011
WIRETAP REPORT 3–4 (June 2012).
54
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2000 Wiretap Report 30 (Apr. 2001).
55
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2009 Wiretap Report 32 (Apr. 2010).
56
See Blumberg & Luke, supra note 30.
50
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that 96% of wiretapped communications provide law enforcement with extremely
valuable location information. The same is true of many Internet connections, whether
fixed or mobile. 57 In other words, the prevalence of immediate communications—texting,
cellular calls, and the like—and centralized services—for example, Gmail and
Facebook—has vastly simplified law enforcement’s ability to both track suspects and
access their communications.
¶32
Another way to assess the overall risk of communications that law enforcement
cannot monitor is to look at the net effect of prior threats: how much has the police’s
ability to monitor communications been affected by prior technological changes, such as
encryption? The issue has long been a concern, so much so that in 1993, the government
announced the so-called “Clipper Chip”—an encryption device designed to enable the
government to read otherwise encrypted traffic. 58 The AO wiretap reports now include
data on how often encryption has been encountered. 59 The data are interesting. The total
between 2001-2011 is eighty-seven; of these, only one was the subject of a federal
wiretap order. Moreover, the AO noted that law enforcement was able to decrypt all of
the wiretapped communications. 60
¶33
There is not a lack of communications products that provide end-to-end encryption,
such as RIM’s Blackberries, Skype, etc. While there are smart criminals who do use—

57
A technology known as “IP geolocation” can be used to determine where an Internet user is located. It
is frequently used to enforce geographic restrictions on access to content. See, e.g., Terms of Use
Agreement, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_info/about_mlb_com/terms_of_use.jsp#4I (last
visited Sept. 24, 2013) (“Due to the foregoing blackout restrictions, you may be required to authorized
MLBAM to access your location data . . . .“). While many IP geolocation services provide fairly coarse
resolution, some companies have done a far better job of geolocation by combining IP address information
with outside data, such as search queries, purchase delivery records, etc.
58
See John Markoff, Electronics Plan Aims to Balance Government Access with Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/16/us/electronics-plan-aims-to-balance-governmentaccess-with-privacy.html; see also Matt Blaze, Notes on Key Escrow Meeting with NSA, RISKS DIG. (Feb.
8, 1994, 4:04 PM), http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/15.48.html#subj1 (“They indicated that the thinking was
not that criminals would use key escrowed crypto, but that they should not field a system that criminals
could easily use against them. The existence of key escrow would deter them from using crypto in the first
place. The FBI representative said that they expect to catch ‘~only the stupid criminals~’ through the
escrow system.”).
59
As a result of Public Law 106-197, since 2000 the AO has reported the annual total of state and
federal wiretap orders encountering encryption. See Pub. L. No. 106-197, § 2, 114 Stat. 246 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2519(2)(b)(iv) (2006)).
60
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2001 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (May 2002) (reporting sixteen
wiretaps encountering encryption in 2001); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2002 WIRETAP REPORT 5
(Apr. 2003) (reporting sixteen wiretaps encountering encryption in 2002 and an additional eighteen in
2001); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2003 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (Apr. 2004) (reporting one wiretap
encountered encryption in 2003); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (Apr.
2005) (reporting two wiretaps encountered encryption in 2004); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005
WIRETAP REPORT 5 (Apr. 2006) (reporting thirteen wiretaps encountered encryption in 2005); ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (Apr. 2007) (reporting no wiretaps encountered
encryption in 2006); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (Apr. 2008) (reporting
no wiretaps encountered encryption in 2007); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 WIRETAP REPORT
5 (Apr. 2009) (reporting two wiretaps encountered encryption in 2008); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 2009 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (Apr. 2010) (reporting one wiretap encountered encryption in 2009);
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 WIRETAP REPORT 9 (reporting six wiretaps encountered
encryption in 2010); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2011 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (June 2012) (reporting
twelve wiretaps encountered encryption in 2011). All but one these were state wiretaps (the one federal
wiretap that encountered encryption occurred in 2004).
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and even build—their own encrypted communications networks, 61 the AO numbers
demonstrate that criminals against whom Title III wiretaps are used typically do not do
so. Instead, they tend to use simple solutions: Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
equipment and communications in the cloud (e.g., Gmail and Facebook). Few use the
peer-to-peer communication channels that pose problems for law enforcement wiretaps. 62
The implication for law enforcement use of vulnerabilities for performing Title III
wiretaps is simple: law enforcement will not need to go that route very often.
¶34
Put another way, criminals are like other people: few use cutting edge or
experimental devices to communicate. Instead, they stick with COTS products. If nothing
else, COTS products are generally easier to use and work better, a definite advantage.
Furthermore, understanding of the fine details of new technologies, such as encryption, is
limited. The distinction between end-to-end encryption and client-to-server encryption is
not understood by most people, criminals included. Similarly, the question of whether the
encryption is going to the right party is often not even asked. Good software usually
performs the proper checks, 63 but even production code has had serious errors. 64
¶35
From this perspective, the most serious threat to legally authorized wiretapping is
exemplified by the Skype architecture. Virtually all email services feature (at most)
encryption from the client to the mail server; the messages reside in plaintext on the mail
providers’ disks. 65 By contrast, Skype provides transparent end-to-end encryption from
the sender to the receiver; there is no middle man that sees the communication “in the
clear.” Skype is gaining an increasing share of the international telephony market. 66 Even
with Skype, however, investigators are not completely shut out. Though the content is

See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Radio Zeta: How Mexico’s Drug Cartels Stay Networked, WIRED (Dec.
27, 2011, 3:41 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/cartel-radio-mexico/.
62
See sources cited supra note 61.
63
The best example is how web browsers use encryption. When a browser connects via HTTPS, the web
server sends its “certificate” to the browser. A full explanation of certificates is out of scope here; what is
important is that they contain a cryptographically protected association between the website’s name and a
unique cryptographic key. Browsers verify that the name of the website contacted actually appears in the
certificate; thus, you will not end up with an encrypted connection to EvilHackerDudez.org when you are
trying to log in to your bank.
64
Generally speaking, encryption on the Internet requires use of a “Public Key Infrastructure”. See, e.g.,
RUSS HOUSLEY, TIM POLK, PLANNING FOR PKI: BEST PRACTICES GUIDE FOR DEPLOYING PUBLIC KEY
INFRASTRUCTURE (2001). Web connections and many other sorts of traffic are protected using the “Secure
Socket Layer”. See, .e.g., ERIC RESCORLA, SSL AND TLS: DESIGNING AND BUILDING SECURE SYSTEMS
(2001). For a discussion of applications that do some checks incorrectly, see Sascha Fahl, Marian Harbach,
Thomas Muders, Matthew Smith, Lars Baumgärtner & Bernd Freisleben, Why Eve and Mallory Love
Android: An Analysis of Android SSL (In)Security,” PROC. 2012 ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER AND COMM.
SECURITY 50 (2012).
65
Although probably technically feasible (though difficult, given the need to comply with industry
standards), it is highly unlikely that providers, such as Google’s Gmail and Microsoft’s Hotmail, will
switch to end-to-end encryption. There is little consumer demand, it is difficult, and Google at least relies
on being able to scan messages in order to display appropriate ads. It cannot do so if the messages
are encrypted.
66
See The Bell Tolls for Telcos?, TELEGEOGRAPHY (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2013/02/13/the-bell-tolls-for-telcos/
(“TeleGeography estimates that cross-border Skype-to-Skype voice and video traffic grew 44% in
2012 . . . .”).
61
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encrypted, Skype leaks the IP addresses of its users. 67 This provides the equivalent of pen
register data and often location information as well. 68
¶36
Technological changes will also play a role in law-enforcement’s ability to wiretap.
However, it is difficult at this point to make confident predictions about the future
direction of technology. The two popular trends, cloud computing and peer-to-peer
networking, have opposite effects on law enforcement’s ability to
monitor communications.
¶37
Cloud computing moves more and more storage and computation to distant,
network-connected servers. Today’s email scenario is an old but telling example: all of a
target’s email passes through easily monitored remote servers. These servers tend to have
stringent backup regimens and log everything, out of operational necessity. Even deletion
operations are less than permanent; 69 preservation of data is paramount, even under
extreme circumstances. 70 In theory, cloud storage could be encrypted; in practice,
because of users’ desire to be able to search their email messages and the lack of
customer demand, there has been little, if any, real-world deployment. 71 In fact, in order
to better serve ads, the Facebook and Google business models rely on the cloud data
being unencrypted.
¶38
The second trend, peer-to-peer, is decentralized, with no convenient points for
wiretaps or content monitoring. Rather than clients and servers, computers, phones, and
other gadgets talk to each other. Consider today’s email architecture, where messages
from Alice to Bob flow from her phone to her ISP’s outbound mail server to Bob’s ISP’s
inbound mail server to Bob’s computer. Must it be done that way, or can Alice’s phone
talk directly to Bob’s computers? Indeed, in some scenarios even ISPs disappear; in a
technology known as “mesh networking,” computers ask other peer computers to relay
their traffic. 72 One very active area of development for mesh networks is car-to-car traffic
for automotive safety and congestion control; 73 this could end up denying law
67
See Joel Schectman, Skype Knew of Security Flaw Since November 2010, Researchers Say, WALL ST.
J., May 1, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2012/05/01/skype-knew-of-security-flaw-since-november-2010researchers-say/.
68
See supra note 57.
69
See, e.g., Microsoft Services Agreement, WINDOWS, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windowslive/microsoft-services-agreement (last updated Aug. 27, 2012) (stating in Section 4.3: “please note that
while content you have deleted or that is associated with a closed account may not be accessible to you, it
may still remain on our systems for a period of time”). Other providers have similar provisions out of
technical necessity.
70
In 2010, a software problem caused thousands of Microsoft’s Hotmail users to lose their entire
mailboxes. Although it took several days, Microsoft was able to retrieve and restore the data from backup
media. See Sebastian Anthony, Hotmail Users Lose Entire Email Inboxes, Microsoft Restores Them 5 Days
Later, SWITCHED (Jan. 3, 2011, 6:50 AM), http://downloadsquad.switched.com/2011/01/03/hotmail-userslose-entire-email-inboxes-microsoft-restores-them/.
71
Encrypted storage and encrypted search are active research areas. However, except under special
circumstances (e.g., a structured database, as opposed to email), encrypted remote search remains much
more expensive than the plaintext equivalent and is likely to remain that way.
72
See, e.g., Rafe Needleman, Unbreakable: Mesh Networks are in your Smartphone's Future, CNET
(July 13, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/8301-30976_1-57471447-10348864/unbreakable-meshnetworks-are-in-your-smartphones-future/.
73
See Jon Brodkin, Wireless Mesh Networks at 65MPH—Linking Cars to Prevent Crashes, ARS
TECHNICA (Jan. 9, 2013, 6:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/01/wireless-meshnetworks-at-65mph-linking-cars-to-prevent-crashes/.
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enforcement access to location data from cellular networks, because the phones would be
talking to other phones in a peer-to-peer fashion rather than registering with phone
company-run cell towers.
¶39
In a cloud world, monitoring will be easier; in a peer-to-peer world, it will be
harder. It is quite possible that both trends will continue, with different applications and
different markets opting for one solution over the other.
D. The TPWG’s Tracking Preferences Expression Standard
¶40

CALEA II, the extension of CALEA to cover all communications applications,
poses three serious problems: (1) it hinders innovation by restricting communications
application developers to certain topological and trust models, (2) it imposes a financial
tax on software, and (3) it creates security holes (and hence increases the risk of computer
crime, cyberepionage, and cyberterrorism). This last point seems to be mentioned least in
debates, although arguably it is the most important since it cannot be addressed by perfect
(or at least very, very good) software development practices, reuse of standard CALEA
compliance libraries, or both.
¶41
An implicit assumption behind CALEA-style laws is that there is a “good” place
where intercepts can take place. Such a place would be run by trustworthy people who
are not implicated in the investigation, 74 and be located where the tap cannot be detected.
More or less of necessity, this translates to relying on a centralized facility, preferably
one run by a large, accountable company. This worked well for the telephone taps, where
all lines were connected to a phone switch run by a conventional phone company. By
contrast, consider a Skype-like architecture with transmissions over a mesh network.
There are no large companies involved in either the call setup or data paths; rather, both
use effectively random links. Furthermore, there may be little or no logging present; not
only is the path used for one call probably not the path used for another, there will be no
logs to show what paths were used. This means little or no accountability for any parties
who leak information, and no assurance whatsoever that anyone will be able to
complete the tap.
¶42
The fact that a peer-to-peer service is not facilities-based—it does not rely on
provider-owned equipment—also means there may be no parties to whom the law
applies. For example, CALEA requires that “a telecommunications carrier shall ensure
that its equipment, facilities, or services . . . enable[e] the government . . . to intercept . . .
all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier . . . concurrently with their
transmission to or from the subscriber’s equipment.” 75 Based on the definition of
telecommunications carrier provided in the statute, however, there are no carriers in some
peer-to-peer architectures: “The term ‘telecommunications carrier’, means a person or
entity engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic communications as a
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (2006) (“No provider of wire or electronic communication service, officer,
employee, or agent thereof . . . shall disclose the existence of any interception or surveillance or the device
used to accomplish the interception or surveillance with respect to which the person has been furnished a
court order or certification under this chapter . . . . Any such disclosure, shall render such person liable for
the civil damages provided for in section 2520.”) Damages after the fact are one thing, but law enforcement
would much rather the tap were not disclosed in the first place.
75
47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2006).
74
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common carrier for hire . . . .” 76 or “a person or entity engaged in providing wire or
electronic communication switching or transmission service to the extent that the
Commission finds that such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of the local
telephone exchange service.” 77 In a peer-to-peer network, there is no such thing as
“local” service; a “peer” need not be geographically close to any of the parties. Similarly,
there may be no “manufacturer of telecommunications transmission or switching
equipment” who can be compelled to “make available to the telecommunications carriers
using its equipment, facilities, or services such features or modifications as are necessary
to permit such carriers to comply with the capability requirements”; 78 the peer nodes and
any commercial entities involved in the service operation (and there need not be any)
may be located outside of U.S. jurisdiction. 79
¶43
To sum up, the laws assume a trustworthy, disinterested intermediary within the
court’s jurisdiction. But as the net moves towards a more decentralized architecture, such
third parties simply do not exist. Current technological trends pose a serious (and
probably insurmountable) philosophical challenge to CALEA-style laws.
¶44
If CALEA were to be extended to cover IP-based communications, the law would
have to specify which part of the service is responsible for supplying wiretap capability.
As noted earlier, peer-to-peer networking is one plausible path for the technical future.
Imposing requirements that effectively block this approach would have a very serious
effect on innovation. Peer-to-peer communications have enabled some important
applications such as BitTorrent, which is used by NASA for sharing satellite images, by
various computer companies for sharing large files (e.g., open source operating systems),
by gaming companies for sharing updates, and even by content providers such as CBS
and Warner Bros. for delivering programming. 80
¶45
There is a second burden on innovation: the extra cost, both in development effort
and development time, to include wiretap interfaces in early versions of software is
prohibitive. At first blush, CALEA compliance seems simple since the only information
that is needed is dialed-out and dialing-in phone numbers and voice. At that level, it is
simple; nevertheless, the document defining the standard interface to a CALEAcompatible switch is more than 200 pages long. 81 Imagine, then, the standards necessary
to cover interception of email, web pages, social networking status updates, instant
messaging (for which there are several incompatible protocols), images, video
downloads, video calls, video conference calls, file transfer layered on top of any of
Id. § 1001(8)(A).
Id. § 1001(8)(B)(ii).
78
Id. § 1005(b).
79
A service without any operators does not imply that no one profits. The original KaZaA filesharing
service was ad-supported. See Ryan Naraine, Spyware Trail Leads to Kazaa, Big Advertisers, EWEEK (Mar.
21, 2006), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Spyware-Trail-Leads-to-Kazaa-Big-Advertisers/; see also
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005) 65 IPR 289 (Austl.); BRIAN
BASKIN ET AL., COMBATING SPYWARE IN THE ENTERPRISE 9–11 (Tony Piltzecker et al. eds. 2006). It is
unreasonable and probably infeasible to impose wiretap requirements on advertisers because the chain of
indirection from the software developer to the advertisers is too long and tenuous. See, e.g., Kate Kaye, The
Purchase-to-Ad Data Trail: From Your Wallet to the World, AD AGE (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://adage.com/article/dataworks/purchase-targeted-ads-data-s/240300/.
80
See, e.g., Brad King, Warner Bros. to Distribute Films Using Bit Torrent, MIT TECH. REV. (May 9,
2006), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/405794/warner-bros-to-distribute-films-using-bit-torrent/.
81
See TELECOMMS. INDUS/ ASS’N, TR-45 LAWFULLY AUTHORIZED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE J-STD025 REV. A (May 31, 2000), available at http://cryptome.org/espy/TR45-jstd025a.pdf.
76
77
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these, games that have voice or instant messaging functions included, and more. It is
simply not a feasible approach. Nor are these improbable uses of the Internet; all of them
are used very regularly by millions of people.
¶46
Applying CALEA to Internet applications and infrastructure will be a “tax” on
software developers. The much lower barriers to entry (relative to traditional telephone
networks currently covered by CALEA) provided by the open architecture of the Internet
have bred many startups. These are small and agile; they are often the proverbial “two
guys in a garage.” Many will fail; even the eventual successes often start slowly.
Regardless, they are essential to the Internet's success. Skype started small, yet it is now
one of the largest international phone carriers. 82 Another example is Facebook, which
was started by an undergraduate in his dorm room. Indeed, the Web began as an
information distribution system at a European physics lab. 83 It is hard to say at what point
an experiment has become large enough to be a “service” worthy of being wiretapfriendly; it is clear, though, that requiring such functionality to be built in from the start is
a non-trivial economic burden and a brake on innovation. By contrast, the PSTN is
primarily composed of large, established companies who buy essentially all of their
equipment from other large, established companies. 84
¶47
The most serious problem with CALEA, however, is that it has created a new class
of vulnerabilities. By definition, a wiretap interface is a security hole because it allows an
outside party to listen to what is normally a private conversation. It is supposed to be
controlled, in that only authorized parties should have access. Restricting access to such
facilities is far more difficult than it would appear; the history of such mechanisms is not
encouraging.
¶48
The risks are not theoretical. In the 2004 to 2005 “Athens Affair,” new code was
injected into the phone switch that used the lawful intercept mechanisms to eavesdrop on
about 100 mobile phones, including the Prime Minister’s. 85 In a similar but less
publicized incident in Italy between 1996 and 2006, about 6,000 people were the target of
improper wiretaps, apparently due to corrupt insiders who sought financial gain. Again,
the lawful intercept mechanism was abused. 86
See supra note 66.
See From a 1997 Hand-Out for the General Public, TEN YEARS PUB. DOMAIN FOR THE ORIGINAL
WEB SOFTWARE, http://tenyears-www.web.cern.ch/tenyears-www/Story/WelcomeStory.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2013).
84
Even for such companies, the expense of adding CALEA facilities was non-trivial. The statute, 47
U.S.C. §§ 1007–1009 (2006), authorized $500 million “to pay telecommunications carriers for all
reasonable costs directly associated with the modifications performed by carriers in connection with
equipment, facilities, and services installed or deployed on or before January 1, 1995, to establish the
capabilities necessary to comply with section 1002 of this title.” The funding was approved in the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, which provided for funding through a combination of money supplied by
various intelligence agencies and $60 million in direct funding. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). An additional $12 million was provided through unspent
Department of Justice funds. More than 95% of the money was actually spent; about $40 million was
rescinded by Congress in 2007. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION ii–iii (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0820/final.pdf.
85
See Prevelakis & Spinellis, supra note 4.
86
See Piero Colaprico, Giuseppe d’Avanzo & Emilio Randacio, ’Da Telecom Dossier sui Ds’ Mancini
Parla dei Politici, LA REPUBBLICA (Jan. 26, 2007),
82
83
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¶49

The U.S. is at risk, too. Phone switches are already large, extremely complex
computer systems; 87 as such, they are inherently at risk. An NSA evaluation of CALEAcompliant phone switches found vulnerabilities in every single one examined. 88 It is not
known publicly if any American phone switches have been penetrated; however, news
reports do suggest foreign interest in American use of surveillance technology to
determine who America’s surveillance targets are. 89
¶50
There is one more aspect of security that has to be taken into account: who the
enemies are. As has been widely reported in the press, various countries have created or
are creating cyberespionage and cyberwarfare units. 90 These are highly skilled and wellequipped groups, easily capable of finding and exploiting subtle flaws in systems. To use
an easy analogy, comparing the capabilities of such units to those of garden-variety
hackers is like comparing the fighting power of modern infantrymen to that of a
comparable-sized group of drug gang members. When considering the security of any
Internet-connected systems that might attract the hostile gaze of foreign powers, this must
be taken into account.
¶51
Communications systems fall into this category and have done so for many, many
years. Even apart from their purely military significance, American economic interests
have long been targeted by other nations. For example, in the early 1970s the Soviets
reportedly used high-tech electronic eavesdropping devices to listen to the phone calls of
American grain negotiators. 91 These days the attempts at economic espionage come not

http://www.repubblica.it/2006/12/sezioni/cronaca/sismi-mancini-8/dossier-ds/dossier-ds.html.
87
W. Keister, R. W. Ketchledge & H. E. Vaughan, No. 1 ESS: System Organization and Objectives, 43
BELL SYS. TECHNICAL J. 1831, 1832 (1964) (calling the development of the 1ESS switch “the largest
development project ever undertaken by Bell Laboratories for the Bell System.”); Ben Chelf, Code
Complexity for Embedded Software Makers Sure Has Changed, EMBEDDED (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://www.embedded.com/electronics-blogs/industry-comment/4026959/Code-complexity-for-embeddedsoftware-makers-sure-has-changed (speaking of “extreme software development projects (e.g., AT&T's
phone switch)”); BRUCE STERLING, THE HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER ON THE ELETRONIC
FRONTIER 37 (1992) (noting that the System 7 “signal transfer point”—a minor piece of phone switching
equipment—is comprised of 10 million lines of source code). The best references that discuss the
complexity phone switch software are proprietary documents (for example, 64 AT&T TECHNICAL J., no. 6,
part 2, a special issue devoted to the 5ESS phone switch). One of the authors of this paper worked in the
software engineering research department of the AT&T 5ESS phone switch development organization and
saw the complexity first-hand.
88
See Susan Landau, The Large Immortal Machine and the Ticking Time Bomb, 11 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2013).
89
See Kenneth Corbin, ’Aurora’ Cyber Attackers were Really Running Counter-Intelligence, CIO (Apr.
22, 2013),
http://www.cio.com/article/732122/_Aurora_Cyber_Attackers_Were_Really_Running_Counter_Intelligenc
e?taxonomyId=3089.
90
For a discussion of exploits sponsored by the Chinese government, see MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING
ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS, available at
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf (last viewed Mar. 31, 2013) and David
Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth, Chinese Army Unit is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tiedto-hacking-against-us.html. For a discussion of exploits being conducted by the Israeli government, see, for
example, William Broad, John Markoff & David Sanger, Israeli Test on Worm is Considered Crucial in
Iran Nuclear Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html. These are just two examples of
many such efforts.
91
DAVID KAHN, KAHN ON CODES: SECRETS OF THE NEW CRYPTOLOGY 193 (1983).
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just from Russia, but also from China, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, South Korea,
India, Indonesia, and Iran. 92
¶52
In 2000, the Internet Engineering Task Force, the engineering group that develops
Internet communications standards through its “Requests for Comment” (RFCs)
documents, concluded that “adding a requirement for wiretapping will make affected
protocol designs considerably more complex. Experience has shown that complexity
almost inevitably jeopardizes the security of communications . . . ; there are also obvious
risks raised by having to protect the access to the wiretap. This is in conflict with the goal
of freedom from security loopholes.” 93 The security vulnerabilities that a wiretap
introduces into a communications system are a serious problem, yet the problem
apparently gets little attention from law enforcement in its efforts to expand CALEA to
IP-based communications.

92
Information on France, Germany, Israel, Japan, and South Korea can be found in INTERAGENCY
OPSEC SUPPORT STAFF,
INTELLIGENCE THREAT HANDBOOK 5-5, 5-6 (1996), while information on China, India, Indonesia, and
Iran can be found in OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, FY07 2, 9–13 (Sept. 10,
2008), available at http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/fecie_2007/FECIE_2007.pdf. The
US has a policy of not conducting economic espionage; in response to the recent NSA leaks, this was
recently stated quite explicitly: “It is not an authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose
to collect such information to afford a competitive advantage to U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors
commercially.” A footnote goes on to say, “Certain economic purposes, such as identifying trade or
sanctions violations or government influence or direction, shall not constitute competitive advantage.”
Directive on Signal Intelligence Activity, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 31 (Jan. 17, 2014).
93
NETWORK WORKING GRP., IETF POLICY ON WIRETAPPING 2 (May 2000), available at
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2804. One of the authors of this paper was on the Internet Architecture Board at
the time and helped write the document.
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Figure 1: A Voice over IP (VoIP), showing physical links, the signaling path,
and the voice path.

III. THE VULNERABILITY OPTION
¶53

We have argued extending CALEA to IP-based communications presents
intolerable security risks and explained how modern communications systems are likely
to impede wiretapping efforts. Given that, how might law enforcement wiretap modern
communications? In this section, we describe the vulnerability option: how they can
resolve the wiretap problem, why vulnerabilities exist, and why the vulnerability solution
must, in fact, always be part of the law enforcement wiretap toolkit. We begin with a
definition of terms.
A.

¶54

Definition of Terms

We need to define a few commonly used technical terms in order to present the
mechanics of employing a vulnerability for accessing a target system. 94
Vulnerability: A vulnerability is a weakness in a system that can potentially be
manipulated by an unauthorized entity to allow exposure of some aspect of the
94
Many of these terms are defined in R. SHIREY, INTERNET SECURITY GLOSSARY, VERSION 2 (Aug.
2007), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc4949.pdf. Others are common terminology in the hacker and
security communities, but have yet to be defined in any authoritative work.
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system. Vulnerabilities can be bugs (defects) in the code, such as a “buffer
overflow” 95 or a “use-after-free instance,” 96 or misconfigurations, such as not
changing a default password or running open, unused services. 97 Another common
type of vulnerability results from not correctly limiting input text (this is also known
as not sanitizing input ), e.g., “SQL injection.” 98 Alternatively, a vulnerability can be
as simple as using a birth date of a loved one as a password. A vulnerability can be
exploited by an attacker. A special instance of vulnerability is the:
Zero-day (or 0-day vulnerability): A zero-day is a vulnerability discovered and
exploited prior to public awareness or disclosure to the vendor. Zero-days are
frequently sold in the vulnerabilities market. The vendor and the public often only
become aware of a zero-day after a system compromise.
Exploit: An exploit is the means used to gain unauthorized access to a system. This
can be a software program, or a set of commands or actions. Exploits are usually
classified by the vulnerability of which they take advantage and whether they require
local (hands-on) access to the target system or can be executed remotely or through a
web page or email message (drive-by). 99 The type of result obtained from running the
exploit depends on the payload (rootkit, key-logger, etc.). The payload is chosen
when the exploit is run or launched. An exploit demonstrates the use of the
vulnerability in actual practice.
95
A buffer overflow is caused by a program accepting more input than memory has been allocated for.
Conceptually, imagine a clerk writing down someone’s name, but the name as given is so long that it
doesn’t fit in the box on a form and spills over into the “Official Use Only” section of the form. A buffer
overflow error was a central part of the Internet Worm of 1988, which resulted in the first case ever brought
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d
504 (2nd Cir. 1991). In some programming languages, e.g., Java, such overflows are detected automatically
by the system; programmers using older languages, such as C, can use safe programming techniques that
avoid the problem. A variety of tools can be used to detect potentially unsafe areas of programs. These
have become increasingly common in the last 10 years, to very good effect.
96
Programs can request storage space, then release (“free”) it when they are done; after that, the space is
available for other uses. A use-after-free bug involves carefully crafted accesses to memory no longer
allocated for its original purpose; if some other section of the program is now reusing that storage, this
section of the program may be confused by the improper reuse.
97
A service is a mechanism by which programs listen for and act on requests from other programs;
often, these services are available to any other computer that can contact this one via the Internet. The best
analogy is to room numbers in a building. The building itself has a single address (the computer analog is
the IP address), but the mailroom is in room 25, the information counter is in room 80, and so on. When
one computer tries to contact another, it must specify the second computer’s address (i.e., the building) and
the service (i.e., the room number). Secure computer systems generally “listen” on very few ports, since
each one represents a potential external vulnerability. (To continue our analogy, a building that does not
need a mailroom will not have one that might somehow be abused.) Suppose, for example, that a computer
that is not intended to act as a web server is in fact running web server code. A flaw in that web server can
result in system penetration; the simplest fix is to turn off the web service since it is unneeded on that
computer. See CERT Advisory CA-2001-19 “Code Red” Worm Exploiting Buffer Overlow in IIS Indexing
Service DLL, CERT (July 19, 2001), available at http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-19.html, for an
example of problems caused by open, unneeded services.
98
In some contexts, parts of the input to a program can be interpreted as programming commands rather
than as data. SQL injection attacks—in variant forms, they date back to at least the 1970s—occur when
programmers do not filter input properly to delete such commands.
99
A drive-by download is an attack perpetrated simply visiting a malicious or infected website. No
further action by the user is necessary for the attack to succeed. Such attacks always result from underlying
flaws in the web browser.
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Payload: The payload of an exploit is the code that is executed on the target system
giving the attacker the desired access. Payloads can be single action, such as
surreptitiously creating a new user account on the system that allows future access, or
multi action, such as opening a remote connection to the attacker’s server and
executing a stream of commands. The payload generally must be customized to the
specific system architecture of the target.
Dropper: A dropper is a malware component or malicious program that installs the
payload on the target system. A dropper can be single stage, a program that executes
on the target system as a direct result of a successful exploit and carries a hidden
instance of the payload, or it can be multi-stage, executing on the target system, but
downloading files (including the payload) from a remote server.
Man-in-the-Middle attack: A Man-in-the-Middle attack is a method of gaining
access to target information in which an active attacker interrupts the connection
between the target and another resource and surreptitiously inserts itself as an
intermediary. This is typically done between a target and a trusted resource, such as a
bank or email server. To the target the attacker pretends to be the bank, while to the
bank the attacker pretends to be the target. Any authentication credentials required
(e.g., passwords or certificates) are spoofed by the attacker, so that each side believes
they are communicating with the other. But because all communications are being
transmitted through the attacker, the attacker is able to read and modify any messages
it wishes to.
Spoofing: In the context of network security, a spoofing attack is a situation in which
one person or program successfully masquerades as another by falsifying data and
thereby gaining an illegitimate advantage. 100

B. How Vulnerabilities Help
¶55

Our claim is that pre-existing vulnerabilities in software make extending CALEA
unnecessary. 101 To understand the scenarios in which these vulnerabilities might be used,
it is necessary to give a simplified description of the structure of modern computer
operating systems. 102 Systems are described in terms of “layers”; each layer provides
some services to the layer above it, and requests services of the layer below it. Often, a
combination of hardware and software enforces the boundary between layers, ensuring
that only certain requests can be made of the lower layer.
¶56
The lowest layer we will mention is the hardware: CPU chips such as Intel’s
Pentium series, devices such as network interfaces and hard drives, USB ports, etc. For
our purposes, we will assume that this layer is error-free and secure. While not strictly
true, attacks at this level are generally more feasible for the greater capabilities of
national security purposes than for law enforcement. 103
100
SHIREY, supra note 94, at 187, 290 (defining “spoofing” as equivalent to “masquerade attack,” which
in turn is defined as “[a] type of threat action whereby an unauthorized entity gains access to a system or
performs a malicious act by illegitimately posing as an authorized entity”).
101
Some of this material appeared in different form in Bellovin, Blaze, Clark & Landau, supra note 5.
102
These days, smartphones are built the same way, so there is no need to discuss them separately.
103
We will not discuss attacks like eavesdropping on encrypted WiFi signals. In principle, though, there
might be exploitable vulnerabilities in the target’s WiFi access point or router. These devices, though, are
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The next layer is generally called the “kernel.” The kernel protects itself against
corruption (with aid from the hardware), and is also the only component that directly
communicates with external hardware such as the network. When a program needs to
read or write from the network or a disk drive, it cannot do so directly; instead, it asks the
kernel to perform the action for it. A consequence of this is that the kernel has to enforce
“file permissions”: which users of the computer own which file, who can read or write
them, etc. That in turn implies that there must be some strong separation between
programs run by different users; again, the kernel enforces this.
The last layer of interest is the “user level” or “application level.” Virtually all
programs of interest—web browsers, mailers, document editors and viewers, and so on—
run at user level. Running programs are typically associated with some user. The user
may be a physical individual; however, all modern systems have a large number of helper
processes, sometimes known as “daemons,” running as some flavor of system pseudouser. These handle such applications as the audio system, indexing files, insertion of USB
devices, and more. A quick check of a modern Apple Mac showed no fewer than 10
different pseudo-users active on the machine.
All modern operating systems have a feature known as a “sandbox.” A sandbox is a
way of enforcing security by allowing a program to run with fewer privileges than the
user who invoked it. 104 Sandboxes are frequently used for programs perceived as
exceptionally vulnerable to security holes, such as PDF viewers and web browsers.
Vulnerabilities—and hence exploits of use to law enforcement—can occur at any
layer, but the capabilities available to the exploit are different at different layers. While
we defer details until Section IV, we note that for an exploit to work, more code is
needed than just something that targets the vulnerability. In particular, to perform a
wiretap—that is, to acquire the contents of a communication—the actual data sent or
received has to be captured. This can be done in a particular application (e.g., Skype or a
game with a voice communications feature), or it could be done at kernel level by
tampering with a “device driver,” 105 in which case data from any application could be
captured. A kernel exploit is well-positioned to modify device drivers; however, for
complex technical reasons such an attack would find it more difficult to read and write
files, export captured data via the network, etc. 106
Most initial penetrations take place at application level. 107 The mechanisms vary
widely, including infected attachments in email, malware on web pages, poor
implementations of network protocols, and users downloading and voluntarily executing
just computers and can be hacked like any other computers.
104
See SHIREY, supra note 94.
105
A device driver is a special part of the kernel that communicates with input/output devices such as
disks, audio ports, network interfaces, etc. See, e.g., ANDREW S. TANENBAUM AND ALBERT S. WOODHULL,
OPERATING SYSTEMS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 231–33 (3d ed. 2006).
106
Even a brief explanation of this is well beyond the scope of this paper. The primary problems are the
nature of I/O APIs—they are generally designed to copy essential parameters from application level—and
the difficulty of waiting for an I/O operation to complete without a “process context.” See, e.g.,
TANENBAUM & WOODHULL, supra note 105.
107
It is generally believed that since kernels do almost no processing of network packet contents (as
opposed to their “headers”), they are therefore much less vulnerable to attacks. This is more generally true,
too. Having a virus-infected attachment in an email message is harmless; by contrast, clicking on it causes
the attachment to be processed and thus causes damage.
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booby-trapped programs under a misapprehension as to the programs’ purpose,
provenance, and good intent. 108 The results are the same: some program the user had not
intended is being run with the user’s file access rights.
Under certain circumstances, this insecurity is sufficient for law enforcement
purposes. For example, it generally provides adequate means for intercepting email. It
may also suffice for looking at the transcript files kept by some instant
messaging programs.
On the other hand, if the program penetrated is not used for the actual
communications of interest, these application-level exploits alone will not suffice.
Consider that on most modern platforms, users—and hence the programs they run—do
not have the ability to tamper with the kernel or system-owned files; note that most
applications, including Skype, are system-owned. Accordingly, if a law enforcement
penetration for the purpose of eavesdropping is executed at user level, a second exploit
known as a “local privilege escalation” 109 attack is needed. This second attack gives the
program elevated privileges and hence the ability to change device drivers, modify files,
etc. 110 While the two exploits are generally independent, frequently both are necessary;
this complicates the attack.
There is one special case worth mentioning. Some daemons run with full system
privileges; if these have faulty implementations of network protocols, only a single attack
is needed. This is a venerable technique, going back to the first Internet worm. 111 While
modern system designs try to avoid daemons with full privileges, 112 in some situations
this is unavoidable.
Historically, some applications have been considerably more vulnerable to user
level attacks than others; these applications include web browsers and PDF viewers. As
noted, modern operating systems often run these programs in sandboxes to prevent theft
of or damage to user files. Sandboxes may also deny the confined program the ability to
run other system commands that may be utilized for privilege escalation. Accordingly, a
third exploit may be necessary to escape from the sandbox; subsequently, privilege
escalation is used as before.

A significant percentage of software downloaded via peer-to-peer networks contains malware. See,
e.g., Michal Kryczka et al., TorrentGuard: Stopping Scam and Malware Distribution in the BitTorrent
Ecosystem 1 (2012), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1105.3671v3.pdf; Andrew D. Berns & Eunjin (EJ) Jung,
Searching for Malware in BitTorrent 4 (2008), available at http://www.cs.uwlax.edu/~aberns/UICS-0805.pdf. Note that much of this is “key generation or activation utility[ies]”; i.e., tools used to steal
software. Id.
109
For more detail on privilege escalation, including an example, see GREG HOGLUND & GARY
MCGRAW, EXPLOITING SOFTWARE: HOW TO BREAK CODE 151–53 (2004). For an additional example of a
local privilege escalation attack as a proof-of-concept, see Posting of Stefan Kanthak, Defense in Depth –
the Microsoft Way (Part 11): Privilege Escalation for Dummies, SECURITY FOCUS,
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/528955/30/90/threaded. “Local” indicates that the attacker must
already have the ability to run code on the targeted system; it cannot be done by a “remote” attacker, i.e.,
one who can only make network connections to the machine.
110
On Windows, the privileged user is known as “Administrator.” On Unix-like systems, including
MacOS and Linux, it is known as “root.”
111
See, e.g., EUGENE SPAFFORD, THE INTERNET WORM PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS 4–6 (Dec. 1988),
available at http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1701&context=cstech; Jon A. Rochlis &
Mark W. Eichin, With Microscope and Tweezers: The Worm from MIT’s Perspective, 32 COMM. ACM 689
(June 1989).
112
The design principle is known as “least privilege.” See SHIREY, supra note 94.
108
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To summarize, there are many different points for initial attack, and all have their
limitations. System privileges are needed to modify applications or device drivers and
can be obtained via either a direct kernel attack, an attack on a system-level daemon, or
via privilege escalation following an application level penetration.
C. Why Vulnerabilities Will Always Exist

¶67

We are suggesting use of pre-existing vulnerabilities for lawful access to
communications. To understand why this is plausible, it is important to know a
fundamental tenet of software engineering: bugs happen. In his classic The Mythical
Man-Month, Frederick Brooks explained why:
First, one must perform perfectly. The computer resembles the magic of legend
in this respect, too. If one character, one pause, of the incantation is not strictly in
proper form, the magic doesn’t work. Human beings are not accustomed to being
perfect, and few areas of human activity demand it. Adjusting to the requirement
for perfection is, I think, the most difficult part of learning to program. 113

¶68

Because computers, of course, are dumb—they do exactly what they are told to
do— programming has to be absolutely precise and correct. If a computer is told to do
something stupid, it does it, while a human being would notice there is a problem. A
person told to walk 50 meters then turn left would realize that there was an obstacle
present, and prefer the path 52 meters down rather than walking into a tree trunk. A
computer would not, unless it had been specifically programmed to check for an
impediment in its path. If it has not been programmed that way—if there is virtually any
imperfection in code—a bug will result. The circumstances which might cause that bug to
become apparent may be rare, but it would nonetheless be a bug. 114 If this bug should
happen to be in a security-critical section of code, the result may be a vulnerability.
¶69
A National Research Council study described the situation this way:
[A]n overwhelming majority of security vulnerabilities are caused by “buggy”
code. At least a third of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
advisories since 1997, for example, concern inadequately checked input leading
to character string overflows (a problem peculiar to C programming language
handling of character strings). Moreover, less than 15 percent of all CERT
advisories described problems that could have been fixed or avoided by proper
use of cryptography. 115

¶70

It would seem that bugs should be easy to eliminate: test the program and fix any
problems that show up. Alas, bugs can be fiendishly hard to find, and complex programs
simply have too many possible branches or execution paths to be able to test them all. 116
FREDERICK P. BROOKS JR., THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH 8 (Anniversary ed. 1995).
In one classic incident, a single missing hyphen in a program contributed to the loss of the Mariner 1
space probe. See Mariner 1, NASA, http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraftDisplay.do?id=MARIN1
(last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
115
TRUST IN CYBERSPACE 110 (Fred B. Schneider ed., 1999).
116
The single capability that gives a computer most of its power is the ability to do things conditionally.
113
114
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Brooks includes a diagram on bugs comparing the predicted and actual rate of bugs
in complex code. 117 The projection assumed a slow start, a rapid increase in the
debugging rate, and a leveling off that suggested the last bugs had been found. Instead,
the rate never leveled off, and the total number of bugs found was significantly higher
than had been forecast. 118 Brooks himself suggests that testing takes about half of total
development time. 119 However, even this is not enough: “Testing shows the presence, not
the absence of bugs.” 120
¶72
We will not recount the myriad techniques other than testing that have been tried in
an effort to eliminate bugs; let it suffice to say there have been many. These include
formal mathematical methods, better programming and debugging tools, different
organizational and procedural schemes, improved programming languages, and more.
Many of these ideas have helped, but none have proved a panacea. The ability to produce
error-free code is the Holy Grail of systems development: heavily desired but
unattainable. 121
¶73
When we are dealing with computer security, though, the question is somewhat
different than whether the program has bugs. Rather, the proper question is whether the
security-sensitive parts of the system have bugs. When formulated this way, there would
seem to be an obvious solution: divide a complex system up into security-sensitive and
security-insensitive pieces; bugs in the latter, though annoying, would not result in
disaster. Such an approach would also improve the correctness of the security-critical
components. The bug rate in code increases more than linearly with the size of the
program; therefore, a program that is twice as large has more than twice as many bugs.
Perhaps the security-sensitive section, which is by definition smaller, would thereby have
far fewer bugs than the system as a whole.

That is, it can test a condition—is this number greater than zero? does this string of characters contain an
apostrophe? is there room on the page for another line?—and continue along one program path or another,
depending on the result of the test. In principle, each conditional operation can double the number of
possible execution paths. (The reality is not quite that bad, because not all tests are independent.) This
means that a program with just 20 conditionals may have more than 220—over 1,000,000—possible paths
through it; one with 40 conditionals (a very tiny number for a realistic program) may have more than
1,000,000,000,000. Exhaustive testing is not possible under these circumstances.
117
See BROOKS, supra note 113, at 92. The diagram is a previously unpublished one by John Harr.
118
Neither the graph nor the text make it clear whether the graph ended because the project was finished
or simply because it was a snapshot of a single year’s experience and did not look at the entire project. The
graph, presented at the 1969 Spring Joint Computer Conference, shows one year of experience building the
#1 ESS; the programming undoubtedly took longer. See PHIL LAPSLEY, EXPLODING THE PHONE 233–38
(2013). The switch itself is described in Keister, Ketchledge & Vaughan, supra note 87. New versions of
the code were unlikely to have fewer bugs; rather, the bug rate increases after some point. BROOKS, supra
note 113, at 53–54.
119
See BROOKS, supra note 113, at 10, 17 (explaining the complexity of the model).
120
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES: REPORT ON A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE NATO
SCIENCE COMMITTEE, ROME, ITALY, 27TH TO 31ST OCTOBER 1969 16 (1970) (quoting E. W. Dijkstra).
121
Operational errors are common, too. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands
of Times Per Year, Audit Finds, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-peryear-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html (“One in 10 incidents
is attributed to a typographical error in which an analyst enters an incorrect query and retrieves data about
U.S phone calls or e-mails.”). Another bug confused the country and city codes for Cairo, Egypt (20 2)
with the area code for Washington, D.C. (202). Id. These sorts of errors led to literally thousands of
incidents of improper collection of surveillance data.
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This approach has been at the heart of most secure system designs for more than
fifty years. It was set out mostly clearly in the so-called “Orange Book,” the 1985
Department of Defense criteria for secure operating system design. 122 The Orange Book
prescribed something called a “Trusted Computing Base,” the security-essential portions
of a system:
The heart of a trusted computer system is the Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
which contains all of the elements of the system responsible for supporting the
security policy and supporting the isolation of objects (code and data) on which
the protection is based. The bounds of the TCB equate to the "security perimeter"
referenced in some computer security literature. In the interest of understandable
and maintainable protection, a TCB should be as simple as possible consistent
with the functions it has to perform. 123

¶75

This dream has proved elusive for two very different reasons. First, modern TCBs
are themselves extremely large, significantly bigger than the entirety of the 1970s and
1980s vintage systems. Although modern software is far more reliable, that does not
translate into absolute reliability. It is worth noting that one of today’s complex
applications is tens of times larger than entire systems from the 1980s, when the Orange
Book was written; this complexity, as we have noted, leaves them very vulnerable to
attack. Today’s operating systems are also vastly larger. Second, the notion of the TCB is
less clear than it once was. More and more serious security incidents target components
that fit no one’s definition of “trusted,” but the attacks are effective nevertheless. For
example, in 1988 the very first Internet worm exploited holes outside what would likely
have been considered part of the TCB. 124 In essence, although not by intent, it was a
denial of service attack: it consumed most of the capacity of the infected machines. This
happened at the user level; the affected programs were not part of the TCB. 125 Put
another way, trying to break up the system into trusted and untrusted parts does not work
as well as had been hoped; bugs anywhere can be and have been exploited by malware.
¶76
We conclude that for the foreseeable future, computer systems will continue to
have exploitable, useful holes. The distinction between flaws in the TCB and flaws
122
DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA
(1985) available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/secpubs/rainbow/std001.txt. The nickname comes from
the color of its cover; it is part of a series of publications known collectively as “The Rainbow Series.”
123
Id. at 65.
124
The worm tried by various means to find and attack other computers. If it ever succeeded, it sent a
copy of itself over to those computers and started executing there as well; meanwhile, the first copy
continued to scan for other targets. There was no check to make sure that a given computer was infected
only once; this meant that vulnerable systems were running very many copies of the worm, sufficiently
many that legitimate programs were crowded out. Furthermore, the Internet itself was clogged by the attack
traffic. Finally, since one of the vulnerable services was email, many sites turned off their mail systems in
an attempt to protect themselves; this, however, hindered coordination of attempts to combat the worm
since many people knew no other way to reach their colleagues at other sites. See SPAFFORD, supra note
111, and Rochlis & Eichin, supra note 111, for more details on the worm’s behavior and structure.
125
This is not strictly true. For technical reasons, one of the programs that were successfully attacked
did run with elevated privileges; however, neither the penetration nor the excess resource consumption by it
were related to those privileges. It ran as privileged (and hence by definition as part of the TCB) because
the importance of avoiding excess privilege was not as well understood in the general community at that
time as it is today.

29

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2014

outside of it is important. Non-TCB programs—frequently known as “user mode” or
“application mode” programs—have the privileges of the user who runs them, whereas
TCB programs are generally all-powerful and have access to more files and the ability to
change them. 126
D. Why the Vulnerability Solution Must Exist Anyway
¶77

Considering lawful intercept purely as an economic question, it is tempting to ask
which is a cheaper solution: a vulnerability-based approach or a CALEA-like law. The
question, however, is not that simple. Even apart from our overriding theme—that
applying CALEA to Internet software creates many very serious risks to both security
and innovation—and apart from the cost-shifting issue (with CALEA-like solutions, the
bulk of the cost is not carried by law enforcement), there is a further, more fundamental
issue: a vulnerability-based intercept capability must exist regardless of any extension of
CALEA The question, then, is not which costs less, but whether the incremental cost of
CALEA is justifiable given that the vulnerability-based approach must be pursued in
any case.
¶78
No matter what a CALEA-like law says, there will always be important situations
where CALEA interfaces will not help law enforcement conduct surveillance. Often,
these will be extremely important, urgent situations involving national security,
counterterrorism, or major drug gangs. 127 Those criminals involved in national security
and counterterrorism are more likely than common criminals to use non-American or
even custom-written communications software and procedures. 128 Other situations in
which a new law will not help include situations with people who use older software that
has not been upgraded to include a lawful intercept feature, and more generally situations
with any communications application that automatically provides end-to-end encryption
capability. 129
¶79
In situations like these, where the case is important and built-in lawful intercept
mechanisms are not available, using vulnerabilities becomes an attractive alternative. The
alternative to using vulnerabilities—a so-called “black bag job” or a covert search—is far

This stark dichotomy between all-powerful and relatively powerless code is generally seen by the
computer security and operating system communities as a bad idea. Many schemes have been proposed to
create intermediate levels of privilege; few, if any, have caught on and been more than minimally effective
at protecting the system. There has been more success of late with sandboxes.
127
The Mexican Zeta drug gang uses a home-built, encrypted radio network. See Michael Weissenstein,
Mexico's Cartels Build Own National Radio System, YAHOO! NEWS (Dec. 27, 2011),
http://news.yahoo.com/mexicos-cartels-build-own-national-radio-system-200251816.html.
128
The Russian sleeper agent ring arrested in 2010 used special programs for steganography, a way of
concealing the very existence of messages. See Noah Shachtman, FBI: Spies Hid Secret Messages on
Public Websites, WIRED (June 29, 2010, 1:11 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/06/allegedspies-hid-secret-messages-on-public-websites/.
129
Even the current CALEA statute states: “A telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for
decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber
or customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information
necessary to decrypt the communication.” 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(3) (2006). The “information necessary to
decrypt the communications” is typically a cryptographic key. If end-users do their own key management,
the provider is unlikely to have the keys.
126
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riskier. 130 Electronically placing a vulnerability on a machine does not put a lawenforcement agent at risk; conducting a black-bag job or a covert search certainly does.
¶80
As with so much other high technology, using vulnerabilities for eavesdropping has
a relatively high start-up cost, whereas continued use does not. Apart from the obvious
drop in the cost per interception, the operational software is likely to improve over time.
That is, as the developers have more time and gain more experience, the overall package
will improve. It will provide more functionality, higher efficiency, and stronger resistance
to detection. The actual exploits used will, as noted, change over time; however, the
exploits are likely to be usable in many more interceptions than in a CALEA-based
world, which will also drive down the cost of each interception. In other words, and to a
much greater degree than in a CALEA-based approach, using vulnerabilities will improve
law enforcement’s abilities in all cases, especially the most critical ones.
IV. VULNERABILITY MECHANICS
¶81

In this section, we examine the potential use of vulnerabilities. We begin by
exploring warrant issues for using exploits to wiretap. We discuss how vulnerabilities
may be exploited, and consider minimization in this environment and what tools and
procedures are available that law enforcement authorities might use or modify to gain
access. We also discuss the vulnerability and exploit markets. Finally, we discuss what
steps would be needed for productizing an exploit specifically for lawful access by law
enforcement.
A.

Warrant Issues

¶82

Obviously, any use of vulnerabilities for wiretapping requires proper authorization.
However, because of the technologies involved, the process for obtaining proper
authorization may be somewhat more involved than for conventional wiretaps.
¶83
One issue is that there are two distinct steps: exploiting the vulnerability, i.e.,
hacking the target’s machine with proper permission, and actually carrying out the
desired interception. Arguably, two different court orders should be obtained. Documents
released under the Freedom of Information Act show the FBI has used such a two-step
process to obtain information in at least one situation. The FBI first sought a search
warrant to install Computer and Internal Protocol Address Verifier (CIPAV) on the
target’s machine, which sends address and protocol information from the target’s
machine to the FBI. 131 Having obtained the IP address and other relevant information by
Such searches are performed when necessary. See, e.g., Schactman, supra note 128.
See Jennifer Lynch, New FBI Documents Provide Details on Government's Surveillance Spyware,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/04/new-fbidocuments-show-depth-government. CIPAV is a current FBI software package analogous to what we are
proposing here. Its capabilities, as described in an affidavit for a search warrant, include collecting the
target machine’s IP address, MAC address, operating system type and version, browser type and version,
“certain registry-type information,” last URL visited, etc. See Affidavit for State of Washington, County of
King, In the Matter of the Search of any Computer Accessing Electronic Message(s) Directed to the
Administrator(s) of MySpace Account “Timberlinebombinfo” and Opening Message(s) Delivered to that
Account by the Government (No. MJ07-5114), at 3, available at
http://politechbot.com/docs/fbi.cipav.sanders.affidavit.071607.pdf.
130
131
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conducting surveillance, the FBI then sought a pen register/trap-and-trace order from the
court; however, this is not always done. In In Re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at
Premises Unknown, the FBI submitted a single Rule 41 warrant application, covering all
activities: finding the target, installing their own software, gathering addresses,
taking pictures, etc. 132
¶84
Another issue that can cause complications is the need for ``technical
reconnaissance’’ to identify the proper target machine. 133 This may involve listening to
other conversations, which would presumably require its own authorization.
¶85
Finally, the design of this sort of tap presents some opportunities for minimization
by technical means, prior to the usual minimization that is required by law. 134 Arguably,
this should be specified in the warrant as well. 135
B. Architecture
¶86

How should a law enforcement exploit software platform be designed? The special
legal requirements, the technical quirks involved in exploitation, the speed with which
technology changes, the lifetime of a vulnerability, the need for non-proliferation, and
even budgetary constraints all suggest that any framework of tools developed for
surveillance must be easily configurable and readily adaptable. This in turn suggests that
a highly modular architecture is needed for a vulnerability-based communications
intercept vehicle. 136
¶87
The particular components to be used against any given target will vary widely.
Consider the choice of initial exploit. For a target with an older (and unpatched) system,
an older and publicly-known exploit might be sufficient, but for wiretapping someone
using a newer operating system, or one that is fully patched, an old vulnerability will not
suffice, forcing the use of a newer one. Further, another target, not using the common
application targeted by either of the previous two, might require yet a third vulnerability.

132
No. H-13-234M, 2013 WL 1729765 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2013). Mark Eckenwiler, formerly a top
Justice Department authority on surveillance, has indicated that intrusions needed to execute pen register
orders can be performed solely on the lesser pen register standard. See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries &
Danny Yadron, FBI Taps Hacker Tactics to Spy on Suspects, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323997004578641993388259674.html.
133
See infra Section IV.D.
134
Minimization is as defined in the wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006) (“Every order and
extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept . . . shall be conducted in such
a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this
chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective . . . .”).
135
See infra Section IV.C.
136
Designing systems to use modules is standard software engineering practice. By definition, modules
communicate via well-defined interfaces, allowing easy substitution of different versions. See, e.g., D.L.
Parnas, On the Criteria to be used in Decomposing Systems into Modules, 15 COMM. ACM 1053, 1053–54
(1972). A good example of a modular framework is a picture editor. Many different file formats—JPEG,
TIFF, PNG, etc.—can be imported into a picture editor. The editing is done in the same way, regardless of
the input format; then, the new version can be stored in any of these formats. In other words, the file format
input/output routine is a separate module. The same is true for vulnerability-based surveillance. With a
well-designed framework, execution of a wiretap could be as simple as choosing a wiretap module, an
exploit, and warrant information, entering the target information, and pressing “Go.” The system would
then build the payload for automatic installation. New exploits or new warrant information would be
separate modules; the rest of the program would not be affected.
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Any of these exploited weaknesses could potentially be closed on the targets’ systems at
any time, which could require the use of yet another vulnerability. 137
¶88
There are other considerations as well. If only voice communications are to be
picked up, there is no need to include a module providing keystroke-logging capability in
the payload. Indeed, the less code that is included, the less the risk of the tap being
discovered. Perhaps more important, code that is not included cannot be repurposed by
someone else, thus aiding in non-proliferation. 138 Beyond that, selective inclusion aids in
warrant compliance, by limiting what is collected to what the court’s order permits. This
is discussed in more detail below. 139
¶89
A modular framework can also be extremely cost-effective relative to other
designs. By design modules are plug-and-play—no matter how different they may be on
the inside, the way the modules communicate with the framework is standardized. The
design makes it easy to have many different people develop exploits for the same
framework, and straightforward for people to use new ones. When an exploit becomes
obsolete, only the module containing that exploit needs to be rewritten or replaced. Preconfigured warrant modules provide assurance to law enforcement that exploits will
collect the communications they need, 140 and assurance to the judge that the exploit and
payload will behave as specified in the warrant. If the investigation changes and a new
warrant module is needed, the exploit executable only needs to be recompiled with the
new module and reinstalled.
C. Technical Aspects of Minimization
¶90

The wiretap statute specifies that: “Every order and extension thereof . . . shall be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception under this chapter . . . .” 141 While this is normally a
matter for judges to rule on, a properly designed intercept package can carry out some of
this task. This provides greater privacy for individuals not targeted by the warrant. More
subtly, by automatically eliminating a lot of the extraneous content, it eases the task of
humans charged with minimization and thus likely reduces their error rate. 142
¶91
A warrant must clearly specify what communications may and may not
be collected:
Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication under this chapter shall specify—
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are
to be intercepted; . . .

See discussion of the lifetime of these components, infra Section IV.E.
See infra Section V.
139
See infra Section IV.C.
140
See id.
141
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006).
142
While we do not suggest or think that a program can perform full minimization, it can certainly carry
out mechanical aspects, e.g., excluding services and perhaps users not covered by the warrant.
137
138
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(c) a particular description
to be intercepted 143

of

the

type

of

communication

sought

¶92

Intercepts that collect more than is authorized are legally problematic, to
say the least. 144
¶93
A modular architecture greatly simplifies the execution of the warrant. Modules for
common warrant specifications would contain pre-configured values, such as types of
data to collect or ignore, specified ports to listen on, and time limits. The framework
would compile these values into a properly tailored exploit executable automatically,
without the need for any special configuration by the law enforcement technicians. 145

Figure 2: A sample warrant configuration screen from Carnivore. This filter is set up to
intercept all inbound (POP) and outbound (SMTP) email from user mode.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(4).
According to documents obtained by the Electronic Privacy Information Center under FOIA, when
the FBI’s UBL unit (Usama bin Laden unit) was conducting FISA surveillance, “The software was turned
on and did not work correctly. The FBI software not only picked up the E-Mails under the electronic
surveillance of the FBI’s target, [redacted] but also picked up E-Mails on non-covered targets. The FBI
technical person was apparently so upset that he destroyed all the E-Mail take, including the take on
[redacted] is under the impression that no one from the FBI [redacted] was present to supervise the FBI
technical person at the time.” Memorandum from [redacted] to Spike (Marion) Bowman (Apr. 5, 2000),
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/fisa.html.
145
“Compilation” is the process of turning human-readable “source code,” written in a language like C
or C++, into the string of bytes that are actually understood by the underlying hardware. At compilation
time, it is possible to select which sections of the program should be included in the eventual module. A
classic treatment of how compilers work can be found in ALFRED V. AHO, MONICA S. LAM, RAVI SETHI &
JEFFERY D. ULLMAN, COMPILERS: PRINCIPLES, TECHNIQUES, AND TOOLS (2nd ed. 2007).
143
144
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The warrant configuration screen 146 from the (now obsolete) Carnivore wiretapping
system 147 provides a useful example. It has options for full content and pen register
capture, fields for identifying which protocols should be captured, which IP addresses or
users should have their data monitored, and so on. A similar scheme should be used here,
with a crucial difference: modules not selected would not be included in the payload
installed on the target’s machine.
¶95
Other information can also be used for minimization. Assume, for example, that
police know from other means that their suspect uses only one of the user profiles (i.e.,
logins) on a shared computer. 148 The intercept module, if properly configured, would
operate only when that user is logged in. Similar filters could be used for
communications applications like Skype that have their own logins.

¶94

D. Technical Reconnaissance
¶96

The reconnaissance phase—learning enough about the target to install the
necessary monitoring software—is essential to a successful compromise of a device.
Because exploits must be exquisitely tailored to particular versions and patch levels,
using the wrong exploit frequently results in failures, and can even raise alerts or cause
suspicious crashes. There are a number of widely used, readily available tools. Many of
the best tools are even available in a free, ready-to-use downloadable toolbox; for
example, the Backtrack-Linux Penetration Testing Distribution. 149
¶97
The most common first step is to check publicly available information. DNS 150 and
Whois 151 lookups are used to find Internet domain and IP information. Simple use of

146
This image is taken from Figure C-16 of STEPHEN P. SMITH, HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., HAROLD
KRENT, STEPHEN MENCIK, J. ALLEN CRIDER, MENGFEN SHYONG & LARRY L. REYNOLDS, IIT RES. INST.,
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT C-17 (2000) (aspect ratio adjusted),
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/carniv_final.pdf.
147
Carnivore was later renamed as the DCS 1000, and has since been retired in favor of commercial
solutions. The apparent abandonment of the package is discussed in the 2002 and 2003 FBI reports to
Congress. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., CARNIVORE/DCS-1000 REPORT TO
CONGRESS 3 (Feb. 24, 2003), available at https://epic.org/privacy/carnivore/2002_report.pdf; FED. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION & U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., CARNIVORE/DCS-1000 REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (Dec. 18,
2003), available at https://epic.org/privacy/carnivore/2003_report.pdf.
148
This is sometimes the case. See, e.g., State of Ohio v. Nicholas J. Castagnola, Nos. CR 10 07 1951
(B) & CR 10 08 2244, slip op. at 11–14 (Mar. 29, 2013).
149
The Backtrack Linux Penetration Testing Distribution is an open-source, ready-to-use linux operating
system specifically customized and configured for security analysts and penetration testers. It can be
installed onto a computer or booted live from a disk or thumbdrive. It contains a comprehensive set of tools
for network and system scanning, vulnerability detection, exploitation, privilege escalation and forensics.
There are also tutorials and How-To’s available and a large user and contributor community. See
BackTrack Linux, BACK|TRACK-LINUX.ORG, http://www.backtrack-linux.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
150
The DNS—the Domain Name System—is used to convert human-friendly names such as
www.fbi.gov to the number IP address understood by low-level Internet hardware. Information in the DNS
is especially useful when trying to break into organizations rather than individual users’ computers. See,
e.g., WILLIAM CHESWICK, STEVEN M. BELLOVIN & AVIEL D. RUBIN, FIREWALLS AND INTERNET SECURITY
31–33 (2d ed. 2003).
151
Whois is a public database lookup service provided by the Internet name registrars that provides
information about the ownership of domain names, address blocks, etc. For more information, see Simone
Carletti, Understanding the WHOIS Protocol, SIMONE CARLETTI’S BLOG (Mar. 27, 2012, 12:13 PM),
http://www.simonecarletti.com/blog/2012/03/whois-protocol/, which gives examples of Whois output.
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search engines and scouring social media sites often provide some information about the
target’s operating system, cell phone platform, service provider, and commonly used
applications. With the appropriate legal process, e.g., a subpoena or court order under 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006), some of this information may also be available from the
service provider.
¶98
If the investigators have access to some emails from the target, a great deal of
information may be found by studying the headers. An examination of some of our test
emails showed such lines as:
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.2 \(1499\))
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1499)

and
X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (10B146).

which are rather clear indicators of which operating system is in use.
¶99
To remotely access a machine, an attacker generally needs to know the IP and/or
MAC addresses of the machine, 152 the operating system (including exact version and
patch level), what services are running on the machine, which communications ports are
open, 153 what applications are installed, and whether the system contains any known
vulnerabilities. This process of discovery is referred to as “Mapping” and
“Enumeration.” 154
¶100
Mapping can be of the system or of the network (or both). Network mapping can be
WiFi or Ethernet, and can refer to finding hidden networks, or to enumerating all the
devices and their addresses connected to a particular network. Mapping the target device
or system requires finding the so-called “MAC address,” a hardware address transmitted
when speaking over Ethernet, WiFi, or Bluetooth networks. If the target of a tap is using
a smartphone at a public hotspot, detecting that person’s MAC address could, for
example, reveal what brand of phone is being used.
152
IP and MAC addresses are networking concepts. MAC addresses are generally hard-wired in a
computer’s communications hardware, though sophisticated users can change them. IP addresses are often
transient, but tend to remain the same for a given computer in a given location. While IP addresses are
typically assigned by the network administrator of the site at which the computer is located, MAC
addresses are assigned by the manufacturer and therefore indicate the computer type and model. See, e.g.,
ANDREW TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS (4th ed. 2003).
153
On networked computer systems, services offered are assigned to particular (and generally
standardized) “port numbers,” a more or less arbitrary value between 1 and 65535. Port enumeration is the
process of seeing what ports, and hence what services, are available on a given system. Using open ports
for intrasystem communication, rather than more secure alternatives, was one of the items cited in the FTC
complaint against HTC. See Complaint at 3–4, In re HTC America, Inc., No. C-4406 (F.T.C. June
25, 2013).
154
“Mapping” is standard networking terminology for discovery of the computers on a network and the
topology of the network itself; the word is even part of the name “NMAP.” See infra note 155.
“Enumeration” is defined in Network Enumerators, SECURITY WIZARDRY,
http://www.securitywizardry.com/index.php/products/scanning-products/network-enumerators.html (last
visited Jan. 6, 2014), though to some extent it is just a technical computer science term for learning a set of
things, as opposed to “brute force” which is trying all possibilities to find one secret.
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¶101

Another way to ascertain the system version is to perform “OS fingerprinting.” OS
fingerprinting involves looking for subtle differences in the network protocol
implementations of different operating systems, and in particular the response of the
system being examined to various probes. NMAP, a freely available popular network
security tool, is most commonly used. In addition to OS fingerprinting, NMAP provides
open service and open port identification and limited vulnerability scanning. 155
¶102
The final step in the information-gathering phase is to scan the target system to see
if it has common vulnerabilities.156
E. Finding Vulnerabilities
¶103

Once the target has been adequately identified and scanned, a suitable vulnerability
must be identified. The primary criterion, of course, is compatibility with the user’s
operating system; another crucial criterion is mode of delivery. Some exploits, for
example, can be delivered by email messages; others require the user visiting a particular
web page, or opening a file containing a specific, vulnerable application. Email delivery
is easiest because it does not require the user to take any particular action, but apart from
the fact that it might be noticed there is always the risk that a spam filter will catch it.157
Another class of exploits requires being on the same local network 158 as the victim, or on
an interconnected network if there are no intervening firewalls. 159 Even infected USB
flash drives have been used; indeed, the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear centrifuge
plant is believed to have started that way. 160

155
GORDON “FYODOR” LYON, NMAP NETWORK SCANNING: OFFICIAL NMAP PROJECT GUIDE TO
NETWORK DISCOVERY AND SECURITY SCANNING xxi–xxii, 205 (2008).
156
There are a number of widely-used vulnerability scanning systems. Nessus (available from
http://www.tenable.com/products/nessus) is the most widely used one; it can scan for thousands of
vulnerabilities and plug-ins, and even provides detailed mobile device information like serial numbers,
model, version, and last connection timestamps. See TENABLE NETWORK SEC., NESSUS: THE WORLD’S
MOST TRUSTED VULNERABILITY SCANNER (2013), available at https://static.tenable.com/datasheets/nessusdatasheet.pdf. Another popular vulnerability scanning system is Nexpose (available from
https://www.rapid7.com/products/nexpose/).
157
Sending email messages crafted to appear genuine to a particular target is known as “spear-phishing.”
In skilled hands, spear-phishing is extremely effective. Press reports suggest that is one of the primary
schemes used by cyberespionage units. See, e.g., Jaikumar Vijayan, DHS Warns of Spear-phishing
Campaign Against Energy Companies, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 5, 2013, 4:03 PM),
https://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9238190/DHS_warns_of_spear_phishing_campaign_against_ene
rgy_companies.
158
A LAN (Local Area Network) is generally a high-speed network that covers a relatively small area.
Typical LANs include most home networks, WiFi hotspots, or, in an enterprise, a single department. LANs
are interconnected to each other or to WANs (Wide Area Network) by routers. See, e.g., ANDREW
TANENBAUM & DAVID WETHERALL, COMPUTER NETWORKS (5th ed. 2010).
159
Most home routers are technically known as Network Address Translators (NATs). For these
purposes, NATs serve the same purpose as firewalls; these attacks cannot be launched at a target that is
behind a NAT. See Geoff Houston, Anatomy: A Look Inside Network Address Translators, INTERNET
PROTOCOL J., Sept. 2004, available at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_7-3/ipj_7-3.pdf.
160
See Stuxnet Dossier, supra note 17, at 3. It is unclear how the infected flash drive was introduced.
See, e.g., James Bamford, The Secret War, WIRED (June 12, 2013, 9:00 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/06/general-keith-alexander-cyberwar/all/.
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Many exploits are publicly announced, 161 and are often available in easy-to-launch
pre-packaged scripts. The Metasploit Project hosts the largest database of these scripted,
publicly available exploits (called “modules”). 162 These modules can be utilized by a
number of different exploitation applications, such as the Metasploit Framework and
Core Impact Pro. 163 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) lists all known vulnerabilities, including what versions of
what systems are affected and references to more information (but no exploit
information). Information about the exploit, including an executable script or some proofof-concept source code, is often published on one of a number of well-regarded websites
and public mailing lists. 164
¶105
Another group of exploits is privately held exploits; these include the zero-days
described above, 165 as well as exploits for sale by professional security vulnerability
researchers. We discuss these in detail in Section G.
¶106
Sometimes, no publicly available vulnerabilities will be usable, and the option of
purchasing one from the vulnerabilities market will be undesirable or unavailable. In that
case, law enforcement agents—more likely, a central “Vulnerability Lab”—must find
one. 166 While this issue is out of scope here, we note there are many commonly available
tools regularly used for finding vulnerabilities by software vendors trying to protect their
products and by attackers.
¶107
Finally, in the rare case where directly compromising a target platform through an
exploit is not possible, a technique known as a “Man-in-the-Middle” (MitM) attack might
be used. 167 Such attacks involve interrupting the communications path between the target
and some site the target is trying to access; the attack tool then intercepts communications
intended for that resource. A successful MitM attack might be another way to launch an
¶104

161
The US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) maintains a frequently updated list of
vulnerabilities. Security researchers and privately owned research laboratories such as Vulnerability Lab
and Immunity, Inc. announce vulnerabilities on websites and Twitter when they are discovered. Verified
vulnerabilities are collected, categorized, and enumerated in the comprehensible, searchable NIST NVD
database. See National Vulnerability Database, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search (last visited Feb. 5, 2014)
162
Each of the exploits in the database consists of a specific vulnerability packaged into a module,
which can be loaded into an attack application, such as the Metasploit Framework, to run. Because of the
popularity of the Metasploit Framework, many exploits sold are available as Metasploit modules. See, e.g.,
Metasploit Exploit, EXPLOIT HUB, https://exploithub.com/product-type/metasploit-exploit.html (last visited
Sept. 24, 2013).
163
The Metasploit Framework, available from http://www.metasploit.com, is the most widely used
exploitation application available today. It is available in both free and commercial versions and has a wide
developer base. See METASPLOIT, http://www.metasploit.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2013). Core Impact Pro
can be purchased from http://www.coresecurity.com.
164
There are many such mailing lists. Perhaps the best-known one is BugTraq,
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1.
165
See supra Section II.A.
166
The FBI already operates the Domestic Communications Assistance Center, which apparently does at
least some of this. See, e.g., Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies,
supra note 2, at 7 (2011) (statement of Valerie Caproni, General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation);
Declan McCullagh, FBI Quietly Forms Secretive Net-Surveillance, CNET (May 22, 2012, 11:44 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/ 8301-1009_3-57439734-83/fbi-quietly-forms-secretive-net-surveillance-unit.
167
MitM attacks can be used at any time. However, they are almost always harder to do, since they
require interfering with the traffic of exactly one user who may be at an unknown location. They are also
more detectable than other attacks, although only by very sophisticated users.
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attack; alternatively, it could permit acquisition of passwords and account information
that would provide law enforcement with access to other useful resources. 168
F. Exploits and Productizing
¶108

While off-the-shelf exploits may be available to law enforcement on the black
market, law enforcement does not require their functionality, which is installing general
purpose remote-access malware to send spam, steal bank account numbers, etc. Rather,
they wish to gather specific items of data authorized by the warrant, and to do so in a
form suitable for presentation in court. In addition, access to a target system by a law
enforcement agent must take care to preserve evidence and chain of custody. 169 This
implies due attention to precise logging of exactly what was done, when, and by whom.
Consequently, off-the-shelf exploits (as opposed to vulnerabilities) are by themselves not
likely to be particularly useful to law enforcement, except as a starting point or perhaps
under exigent circumstances. 170 What law enforcement needs are specialized
eavesdropping products, products that use exploits to produce legally acceptable
communications intercepts, and do so as simply and as cheaply as possible while still
complying with all legal requirements.
¶109
The three functional components of a law enforcement eavesdropping product—the
exploit (which provides access to the system), the eavesdropping code, and the
supporting infrastructure—all have different characteristics and lifetimes. Exploits have
the shortest lifetime due to their specificity, installation characteristics, vendor patches,
etc. Accordingly, a good methodology for use of exploits is the dropper/payload model,
where the eavesdropping product is composed of two principal parts: a dropper and a
specially encrypted payload that is specifically encrypted for the particular target. (This
payload includes the second and third components.) A penetrator is used as the dropper,
which is the initially injected code that exploits the actual vulnerability and thus gains
access to the target system. Once access is acquired, the penetrator decrypts the payload.
The payload is encrypted as a security measure to ensure the penetration code cannot
easily be detected or reused by criminals; it also ensures that the payload targets the
correct system. A payload is specifically encrypted for a particular target by using targetspecific information like serial numbers, the MAC address, IP address, etc., as the key to
encrypt and decrypt the payload. 171 The penetrator picks this information up, which
would have been acquired during earlier technical reconnaissance, at payload installation
Depending on the provisions of the original warrant, it may be necessary to seek a modification. In
particular, a warrant permitting interception of communications does not grant the right to search stored
email archives; that would require an order under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
2712 (2006).
169
See Timothy M. O’Shea & James Darnell, Admissibility of Forensic Cell Phone Evidence, U.S.
ATT’YS' BULL., Nov. 2011, at 47–49, available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5906.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL PROCEDURES AND CASE LAW FORMS 27–31 (June 2005), available
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/elec-sur-manual.pdf (discussing sealing intercepts to protect
their integrity).
170
See infra Section IV.G.
171
Encryption is accomplished through the use of an algorithm, which may be public, and a key, which
is a piece of secret data. If the encryption algorithm is strong, it should be effectively impossible to decrypt
the file without knowledge of the key.
168
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time. This method protects untargeted machines from compromise: if the code is
executed on the wrong machine, decryption will fail.
The payload itself should be designed to provide the access specified in the warrant
with minimal changes to the target system. Those changes that are necessary should be
logged and time-stamped as to provide documentation that vital evidence was neither
altered nor destroyed. If the warrant includes provisions for recording communications,
the payload should also contain provisions for minimization, including the ability to turn
recording on and off and the length and time of communications recorded. Payloads do
not change very much over time; while they may need to adapt to different major
versions of operating systems, they generally rely on features not likely to change very
often. Further, payloads that have already been installed are rarely disabled by
vendor patches.
The supporting infrastructure (which is also part of the payload) has an
intermediate lifetime. Some of the infrastructure, such as the code to set up encrypted
channels to the investigators, is straightforward and not particularly tied to unusual law
enforcement needs; this code will be quite long lived. The command-and-control
subsystem—the mechanism with which investigators control the tap, turn recording on
and off, etc.—is similarly straightforward, although the fine details will be specific to the
application. Much of this code will be virtually the same even across different operating
systems. On the other hand, the concealment mechanisms—the code that hides the
existence of the payload from the computer’s owner and specialists who may be hired to
“sweep” the computer for bugs—is likely to be highly dependent on the operating
system, including the particular version, and will change fairly frequently.
It is a good idea for the payload to have a self-destruct option, perhaps the time
limit set by the warrant, after which the law enforcement software restores the target
system to its pre-exploit state, erases itself, and removes all evidence of its presence. 172
This not only helps prevent proliferation, it may be necessary to comply with the legal
requirements for time limits on wiretap orders. 173
A good example of how non-proliferation might work in practice is demonstrated
in a variant of Stuxnet 174 called Gauss. Discovered in August 2012, Gauss appears to be
an espionage tool. 175 It uses a known vulnerability and shares some code with other
known malware in its dropper, but even after several months of intense analysis, the
behavior of its payload remain unknown. Gauss uses cryptographic methods and tools,
and only installs and runs on machines specifically targeted by Gauss’s developers; on
Fritz Hohl, Time Limited Blackbox Security: Protecting Mobile Agents from Malicious Hosts, in
MOBILE AGENTS AND SECURITY 90, 97–107 (Giovanni Vigna ed., 1998), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.40.8427.
173
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(e) (2006) (“Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any
wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall specify . . . the period of time during which
such interception is authorized . . . .”).
174
See Stuxnet Dossier, supra note 17.
175
Dan Goodin, Nation-Sponsored Malware with Stuxnet Ties has Mystery Warhead, ARS TECHNICA
(Aug. 9, 2012, 1:23 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/08/nation-sponsored-malware-has-mysterywarhead/; KAPERSKY LAB GLOBAL RESEARCH & ANALYSIS TEAM, GAUSS: ABNORMAL DISTRIBUTION, at
21, available at https://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf, which provides
proof of concept despite being an intelligence effort rather than a law enforcement one. The program
collects a number of data items, but some of the code is encrypted with a target-specific string. This feature
helps prevent proliferation.
172
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non-targeted machines it remains encrypted and inert. Gauss also sets up a secure method
to send data to its command and control centers. Ars Technica reports that “The setup
suggests that the command servers handled massive amounts of traffic,” 176 indicating that
this technique could send large amounts of data, not just a communications tap.
G. The Vulnerabilities Market
¶114

One simple way for law enforcement to obtain useful vulnerabilities is to buy them.
With the availability of openly published vulnerability information and free exploitation
tools, one might question why we discuss purchasing vulnerabilities or exploits from
researchers at all. The answer is the improved security of target systems. As software
developers and vendors have improved the quality of their software and incorporated
defenses such as firewalls and anti-virus packages, vulnerabilities have become harder to
find and to exploit. Software companies have also generally accelerated the rate at which
they release security patches after critical vulnerabilities have been announced. This can
result in a well-patched and well-maintained system more difficult to compromise.
Additionally, as stated above, exploits must be carefully tailored to the individual target
machine. This means it requires more skill to develop a working exploit, making new
effective exploits a valuable commodity for their creator. A technically savvy target,
someone who is conscientious about maintaining their system with up-to-date security
patches, is also likely to be careful about not installing software from unverified sources,
to use encryption, to not open links from email, and likely does not access questionable
websites, and so may not be vulnerable to the easy public exploits. If law enforcement
wishes to use a zero-day or lesser-known vulnerability to exploit a target, it must either
have the appropriate vulnerability and exploit already on the shelf, or else it must
purchase one on the open market. The market itself is a relatively recent phenomenon.
¶115
Finally, there may sometimes be a need to tap a particular suspect as quickly as
possible. If there are no suitable off-the-shelf exploits available to the investigators and
no time to find a new one, purchasing one may be the best option. 177
¶116
The overt vulnerabilities marketplace had its start in 2004 when Mozilla launched
the first successful bug-bounty program. 178 This program, still in effect today, pays
security researchers for original vulnerabilities they discover. 179 Many other companies
have followed suit with their own bug-bounty programs. Product developers, however,
are not the only groups that are interested in obtaining information regarding software
176
Dan Goodin, Puzzle Box: The Quest to Crack the World’s Most Mysterious Malware Warhead, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 14, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/03/the-worlds-most-mysteriouspotentially-destructive-malware-is-not-stuxnet/.
177
That an exploit has been purchased instead of being developed in-house does not change the need to
report it promptly. However, under urgent conditions some delay may be appropriate. See infra Section
VII.B.
178
See Press Release, Mozilla Found., Mozilla Foundation Announces Security Bug Bounty Program
(Aug. 2, 2004), available at https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/press/mozilla-2004-08-02.html. For further
examples of bug bounties, see Kim Zetter, With Millions Paid in Hacker Bug Bounties, Is the Internet Any
Safer?, WIRED MAGAZINE (Nov. 8, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/11/bugbounties/all/ (listing prices, total paid out, and launch date for several bug bounty programs).
179
See Bug Bounty Program, MOZILLA, https://www.mozilla.org/security/bug-bounty.html (last updated
May 22, 2013).
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vulnerabilities. Governments and computer security service providers such as iDefense
and ZDI also pay for vulnerability information, particularly if the details on how to use it
have not been made public (zero-days). 180
¶117
The overt and black markets in vulnerabilities, exploits, and zero-days have
expanded in recent years. 181 Many legitimate security research firms have made finding
vulnerabilities and developing exploits for sale part of their business model. 182
Companies and individuals sell information about privately discovered vulnerabilities,
often with a proof-of-concept or full-blown exploit code, to groups of subscribers and to
individuals. The prices of and amount of detail about the vulnerabilities made public
varies. Some companies (e.g., Vulnerability-Lab) and researchers publicly announce that
a vulnerability has been discovered in a particular product, but reserve actual details for
their customers. 183 Other companies, such as Endgame, keep even the knowledge of the
existence of the vulnerability private. 184 Prices range from $20 to $250,000, 185 with
exclusive access to a critical zero-day generally the most expensive. Recent news reports
suggest that national governments, in particular intelligence and military agencies, have
become major buyers. 186
¶118
Companies such as Vupen, Revuln, and Vulnerability-Lab sell subscription
services that provide exclusive detailed information on disclosed or private critical

180
In Feb 2006, iDefense, a vulnerability research company owned by VeriSign, Inc., offered a $10,000
prize for a ‘previously unknown’ Microsoft security vulnerability. One of the requirements for winning the
prize was that the vulnerability be submitted exclusively to iDefense. See Brian Krebs, Wanted: Critical
Windows Flaw … Reward: $10,000, SECURITY FIX (Feb. 16, 2006, 1:40 PM).
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2006/02/wanted_critical_windows_flaw_r.html.
Similarly, it states in the frequently asked questions for Tipping Point’s Zero Day Initiative that once a
vulnerability has been assigned to TippingPoint, it cannot be distributed—or even discussed—elsewhere
until a patch is available from the vendor. See Frequently Asked Questions, ZERO DAY INITIATIVE,
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/about/faq/#17.0 (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
181
Presumably, if criminals were the only ones interested in purchasing vulnerabilities, the market
would still exist, but it would be underground. Similar markets do exist for other forms of criminal
software, such as bots, credit card number loggers, etc.
182
Some prominent examples include: Vupen Security, Vulnerability-Laboratory, Immunity, Inc.,
Netragard, NSS Labs, Inc., and Raytheon.
183
Vulnerability Lab posts announcements of vulnerabilities discovered both on its website,
http://www.vulnerability-lab.com, and on Twitter, https://twitter.com/vuln_lab.
184
VUPEN Vulnerability Research Team, Google Chrome Pwned by VUPEN aka Sandbox/ASLR/DEP
Bypass, VUPEN SECURITY (May 9, 2011, 5:35 PM),
http://www.vupen.com/demos/VUPEN_Pwning_Chrome.php (“For security reasons, the exploit code and
technical details of the underlying vulnerabilities will not be publicly disclosed. They are available to our
customers as part of our vulnerability research services.”); Vulnerability Feeds, REVULN,
http://revuln.com/services.htm#vulnfeeds (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (explaining that Revuln sells access
to its 0-day Feed, which provides “[i]nformation about undisclosed and unpatched security vulnerabilities
found by [their] team in third party hardware and software products of various vendors. The vulnerabilities
included in [their] 0-day feed remain undisclosed by ReVuln unless either the vulnerability is discovered
and reported by a third party or the vendor publicly or privately patches the issue.”).
185
Exploits currently offered for public sale from a wide variety of independent researchers can be
purchased from http://exploithub.com. Further examples of exploits offered for public sale can be found in
Andy Greenberg, Meet the Hackers Who Sell Spies the Tools to Crack Your PC (And Get Paid Six-Figure
Fees), FORBES (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/21/meet-the-hackerswho-sell-spies-the-tools-to-crack-your-pc-and-get-paid-six-figure-fees/.
186
See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackerssell-computer-flaws.html.
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vulnerabilities to governments, law enforcement authorities, and corporations. 187 Annual
subscriptions can run as high as $100,000 a year. 188 These companies also sell working
exploits and offer special targeted exploit development for additional fees; exploit prices
range from $5,000 to $250,000. The most valuable are those zero-days that can be used
for cyber warfare. For example, the Endgame Systems pricelist includes a twenty-five
exploit package for $2.5 million. 189 Zero-days and exploits can also be purchased from
exploit brokers such as Netragard or private brokers who bid on exploits from sellers and
negotiate with buyers on behalf of individual exploit developers. 190

____________________________
¶119

The FBI has already used vulnerabilities to download exploits and extract
information from various targets machines. But if law enforcement uses vulnerabilities
and exploits to conduct wiretaps when other methods fail 191 (and as an alternative to
CALEA-style taps in the intellectual property world), it will face a difference in scale in
the use of such techniques—and thus a difference in kind. That raises not just technical
questions, but complex ethical and legal concerns as well. In the sections that follow, we
turn to those.

See, e.g., VUPEN SECURITY, VUPEN THREAT PROTECTION PROGRAM, available at
http://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/files/0/279_VUPEN-THREAD-EXPLOITS.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
188
See Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 186.
189
Michael Riley & Ashlee Vance, Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
MAG. (July 20, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/cyber-weapons-the-new-arms-race07212011.html#p4 (quoting David Baker, the vice-president for services at the security firm IOActive, as
saying, “‘Endgame is a well-known broker of zero days between the community and the government.’ By
‘community,’ he means hackers—‘Some of the big zero days have ended up in government hands via
Endgame . . . .’”).
190
A number of reports have been published recently documenting the vulnerabilities market and the
brokers who negotiate between buyers and sellers. See The Digital Arms Trade, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 30,
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21574478-market-software-helps-hackers-penetratecomputer-systems-digital-arms-trade; Zero Day Exploit Acquisition Program, NETRAGARD,
http://www.netragard.com/zero-day-exploit-acquisition-program; Andy Greenberg, Shopping For ZeroDays: A Price-List for Hackers’ Secret Software Exploits, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2013, 9:43 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/23/shopping-for-zero-days-an-price-list-for-hackerssecret-software-exploits/.
191
The FBI has said very little about its use of vulnerabilities, let alone why it uses them. Examination
of available evidence suggests that their primary reason is when they do not know where the target system
is; see, for example, Kevin Poulsen, FBI Admits it Controlled Tor Servers Behind Mass Malware Attack,
WIRED (Sept. 13, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/freedom-hosting-fbi/, which
discusses how the FBI used malware to identify child porn viewers who had used Tor. Also note that the
FBI would not talk to the press about it, but did talk in court when they had to. See In Re Warrant to Search
a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, No. H-13-234M, 2013 WL 1729765 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2013)
for an example of such a case.
187
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V. PREVENTING PROLIFERATION
¶120

As should already be clear, the use of an exploit to download a wiretap is far more
complex than simply placing two alligator clips on a wire. 192 But what is a far more
serious impediment to using exploits is that the exploits employed in the installation of
the wiretap may spread beyond the targeted device. Given that possibility, does the
government even have the moral right to use vulnerabilities in its efforts to combat crime
and protect national security? We consider this issue, and then examine techniques to
prevent proliferation of the exploit beyond the intended target.
A.

Public Policy Concerns in Deploying Exploits to Wiretap

¶121

We start with some assumptions. First, there is probable cause that the suspect is
committing a serious crime and using the targeted communications device to do so.
Second, other means of investigation have been tried and have not netted the requisite
information. Third, a wiretap order has been authorized, but the target is using a
communications device that prevents the standard methods of interception from working.
Is it moral to use an exploit to intercept the communication when there is some risk,
however small—but perhaps larger than anticipated— that the exploit may escape the
device and be used elsewhere, causing great harm?
¶122
The problem of potentially doing harm in the process of doing good is a wellknown problem in philosophy known as “the doctrine of double effect,” in which one
pursues a moral action that has a consequence of causing harm. The philosopher Phillipa
Foot argued that the distinctions should be between direct intention and oblique action,
between avoidance of harm and activities to help, 193 and between duties and voluntary
actions. She constructed a series of trenchant examples to illustrate this, including the
following:
•

Should a judge who is faced with an angry crowd demanding justice, frame and order
the execution of an innocent person to save many others from deaths
through rioting? 194

¶123

Foot observes that the salient issue is not justice, but rather direct versus oblique
effects. 195 That is the distinction between what we do (direct intention) and what we
allow (oblique action). The judge should not hang an innocent man—direct effect—even
if more people die as a result of the rioting that ensues.
¶124
Foot makes a distinction between negative duties—avoidance of harm—and
positive duties—bringing aid, 196 as well as between duties and voluntary actions, and
concludes that a critical distinction is whether one is bringing aid—a voluntary action—
or performing one’s duty. 197 Foot illustrates the issue with another example:
See supra note 20.
PHILLIPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19–32 (1978).
194
Id. at 23.
195
Id. at 24 (“To choose to execute [an innocent man] is to choose that this evil shall come about, and
this must therefore count as a certainty in weighing up the good and evil involved.”).
196
Id. at 25.
197
Id. at 29.
192
193
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Should the driver of a runaway tram deliberately aim the tram at one man on the
track to stop it or steer the other way, where five men are working and will be
killed? 198

The driver of the tram is performing a duty and has a responsibility to injure as few
people as possible. The driver would be behaving morally in electing to take the track
with the single individual.
In using vulnerabilities to execute wiretaps, law enforcement investigators are
performing their required duty of investigating a criminal activity. Under Title III, if a
wiretap order is granted this means that evidence is essentially unobtainable in other
ways. 199 The duty of investigating the criminal activity may require wiretapping. If the
only way to affect the wiretap is through the use of an exploit, then, following the logic
presented by Foot regarding duty, this is the way to proceed. But there must be due
diligence to contain the harm. There are several aspects to containing the harm, including
fully vetting necessity and balancing it against the harm that may result and designing the
exploit to prevent proliferation beyond the target. 200
The law balances competing social goods. For example, the Fourth Amendment
balances the social good to society of protecting itself against the social good of
protecting individual privacy and security. 201 Law enforcement’s use of vulnerabilities
can be considered within the same framework of competing social goods. Use of
vulnerabilities, at least without reporting them, is not unlike police use of confidential
informants (CIs). CIs inform investigations even while aiding criminal activity.
A common law enforcement tactic is to use a lesser criminal to gather evidence
about a higher-up criminal. Within limits, crimes (including further crimes) committed by
a “flipped” individual are largely forgiven, so long as that person is providing good
evidence against the real target of the investigation. As Daniel J. Castleman, chief of the
Investigative Division of the Manhattan district attorney’s office, explained, “With
confidential informants we get the benefit of intimate knowledge of criminal schemes by
criminals, and that is a very effective way to investigate crime . . . .” 202
What happens with wiretaps implemented via exploits is ultimately not very
different. In both cases law enforcement seeks to catch what it believes to be a genuinely
dangerous criminal. But here it seeks to do so by the collection of wiretap evidence.

Id. at 23.
Recall that 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (2006) requires that "normal investigative procedures have been
tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." But see
United States v. Smith, 893 F.2d 1573, 1582 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Although a wiretap should not be used
routinely as the first step in a criminal investigation, it need not be the last resort.”).
200
There are other harms that may result from using the exploit, such as excessive collection, but these
are not substantively different from concerns in “normal” wiretapping efforts. The issue of proliferation is
substantively different.
201
While the usual interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is that it centers on protecting the privacy of
the individual against searches by the state, Jed Rubenfeld convincingly argues that the amendment really
concerns providing security for individuals against searches by the state. See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of
Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 120–38 (2008).
202
Alan Feuer & Al Baker, Officers’ Arrest Put Spotlight on Police Use of Informants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
27, 2008, at 26.
198
199
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Installing the tap requires exploiting a vulnerability that law enforcement hopes will not
be repaired before the tap is in place.
The purchase and secret use of vulnerabilities raises several similar moral
dilemmas as the use of confidential informants (CIs). The history of police use of CIs is
replete with instances where an informant went too far, committing or failing to stop
serious criminal activity; this has even included murder. 203 With wiretaps the “too far” is
of a somewhat different character, but with similar consequences: some crimes that the
government could have stopped may not be prevented. By not reporting the vulnerability
to the vendor and speeding its repair, law enforcement’s inactivity is potentially enabling
criminal activity against users of the hardware or software. It is thus useful to examine
how law views the competing interests of preventing crime versus investigating criminal
activity in the use of confidential informants, the closest analogy that exists in practice to
the use of unreported vulnerabilities.
In United States v. Murphy, the Seventh Circuit considered a case in which FBI
agents created fictitious cases in the Cook County Courts in order to uncover corruption
within the legal system. 204 The Seventh Circuit ruled that the false cases were a
legitimate investigatory tool, observing that “the phantom cases had no decent place in
court. But it is no more decent to make up a phantom business deal and offer to bribe a
Member of Congress. In the pursuit of crime the Government is not confined to behavior
suitable for the drawing room. It may use decoys, . . . and provide the essential tools of
the offense . . . . The creation of opportunities for crime is nasty but necessary
business.” 205
The choice to use vulnerabilities without also simultaneously reporting them to the
vendor is not precisely “the creation of opportunities for crime,” but rather the choice not
to pro-actively prevent crime. Murphy makes clear that this type of approach can be
legally legitimate. Whether it is acceptable is a moral, public policy, and
political question.
Department of Justice guidelines on the use of confidential informants state that a
Justice Law Enforcement Agent (JLEA) is never permitted to authorize a CI to
“participate in an act of violence; . . . participate in an act that constitutes obstruction of
justice (e.g., perjury, witness tampering, witness intimidation, entrapment, or the
fabrication, alteration, or destruction of evidence); . . . participate in an act designed to
obtain information for the JLEA that would be unlawful if conducted by a law
enforcement agent (e.g., breaking and entering, illegal wiretapping, illegal opening or
tampering with the mail, or trespass amounting to an illegal search); or . . . initiate or
instigate a plan or strategy to commit a federal, state, or local offense.” 206 The guidelines
do not state, however, that a CI must work to prevent a crime from occurring. The

There are multiple such examples, including the well-known shooting of Viola Liuzzo, a white
supporter of the Civil Rights movement who was shot by Ku Klux Klan members while driving from a
march in Selma, Alabama, one of whom was an FBI informant. DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME:
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA: THE CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 572–73 (2001).
204
768 F.2d 1518, 1524 (7th Cir. 1985).
205
Id. at 1529.
206
Illegal activity must be authorized in advance for a period of up to ninety days. See DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS (Jan.
8, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/ciguidelines.htm.
203
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analogous situation to the use of vulnerabilities would be that law enforcement is not
required to let vendors know about the vulnerabilities they find and exploit.
¶134
Immediately reporting versus using for some time before reporting is a clash of
competing social goods, which is what we need to weigh here. If our primary concern is
preventing the proliferation of exploits, society will be better protected by reporting the
vulnerability early even if that risks the ability of the criminal investigation to conduct its
authorized wiretap.
¶135
As we know from other situations, whether rare diseases or the effect of cold
weather on shuttle O-rings, 207 a rare side effect is more likely to appear when working
with a large population sample. The danger of proliferation means each use of an exploit,
even if it has previously run successfully, increases the risk that the exploit will escape
the targeted device. This introduces a serious wrinkle in the use of vulnerabilities, one
that law enforcement must address, and that we discuss in subsection C and section VI,
supra.
B. Ethical Concerns of Exploiting Vulnerabilities to Wiretap
¶136

Even though wiretaps have long been accepted as a tool in law enforcement’s
toolbox, there is something distasteful about using an exploit to download interception
capability. Undoubtedly, part of that distaste stems from the strong sense that
vulnerabilities are to be patched, not exploited. But even if law enforcement were never
to report the vulnerabilities it discovers or purchases, law enforcement’s use of
vulnerabilities would not make the vulnerability situation worse. Law enforcement does
not currently report vulnerabilities to vendors. Thus, were law enforcement to use
vulnerabilities and not report them to the vendors, there would be no change to the status
quo ante. That said, there are still some concerns raised by law enforcement’s
use of vulnerabilities.
¶137
One danger of law enforcement’s participation in the zero-day market is the
possibility of skewing the market, either by increasing incentives against disclosure of the
vulnerability or by increasing the market for vulnerabilities and thus encouraging greater
participation in it. Because of the current size of the market and the relatively minimal
need by law enforcement, we do not believe that this will be an issue. It is hard to know
exactly under which circumstances vulnerabilities will be used since the FBI has not
discussed under what technical circumstances they have encountered difficulties
wiretapping, but we do believe usage will be rare.
¶138
What is the government’s responsibility in cases where the operationalized
vulnerability escapes the target? It is not unheard of for physical searches to go amiss;
sometimes law enforcement executes a warrant on the wrong location or executes a
wiretap warrant on the wrong phone line. 208 Such a search would, of course, invalidate
Howard Berkes, Reporting a Disaster’s Cold, Hard Facts, NPR (Jan. 28, 2006, 1:27 PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5175151.
208
See, e.g., INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER, [REDACTED] DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION HEADQUARTERS, IOB MATTER 2005-160 (June 30, 2010), available at
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/intel_oversight/IOB%202005-160.pdf. It is rare that such
activity is publicly reported. Documents Obtained by EFF Reveal FBI Patriot Act Abuses, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Mar. 31, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/03/documents-obtained-eff207
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collection. But a wiretap exercised through an operationalized payload is a significantly
different situation. Unlike an incorrectly executed wiretap warrant, which might simply
collect information on the wrong party, a badly designed payload could escape its target
and potentially affect a much larger group of people.
¶139
If the operationalized vulnerability were to escape its target, it might be adapted for
malicious purposes by others, a second-order affect that increases the need for great care
in developing the exploits. While the government may have some liability when it knocks
down the wrong door in the course of exercising a search warrant, 209 with wiretap
software the liability—in dollars or simply in costs to society— is not as well understood.
¶140
As a result, it is critical that the tools employed by law enforcement be trustworthy
and reliable. In particular, the technical implementation must capture only what is
authorized. In addition, all the usual security provisions apply: the system must employ
full auditing of actions taken or system changes made, 210 each user of the system must
log on individually, etc. 211 Such careful controls have not always been exercised in the
past, as is evidenced by flaws discovered in the FBI’s DCS 3000 wiretap system, 212 as
well as poor documentation of telephone transactional data requests during FBI
investigations post-September 11th. 213 This argues for not only judicial oversight, but
technical oversight as well.
¶141
Finally, one might imagine a scenario in which law enforcement puts pressure on
vendors not to fix vulnerabilities so as to facilitate exploits. Aside from being bad public
policy, such an approach would be dangerous for both government and industry. If such
pressure became publicly known, the vendor would suffer serious reputational harm. It is
not inconceivable that the vendor could also be liable to customers for damages if the
company knew of a serious vulnerability about which it had neither informed its
customers nor patched to eliminate the vulnerability. 214
C. Technical Solutions to Preventing Proliferation
¶142

The principle of only harming the target must govern the use of vulnerabilities by
law enforcement. One means of ensuring that only the target is harmed is to employ
reveal-fbi-patriot-act.
209
Cf. Jim Armstrong, FBI Uses Chainsaw in Raid on Wrong Fitchburg Apartment, CBS BOSTON (Jan.
31, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2012/01/31/fbi-uses-chainsaw-in-raid-on-wrongfitchburg-apartment/.
210
This was missing in the Greek wiretapping case. See Prevelakis & Spinellis, supra note 4.
211
There are many commercial and government guides to operating secure computer systems. See, e.g.,
Operating Systems, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY,
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/mitigation_guidance/security_configuration_guides/operating_systems.shtml (last
updated Aug. 14, 2013).
212
The system was previously known as Carnivore. See Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, David Farber,
Peter Neumann & Eugene Spafford, Comments on the Carnivore System Technical Review (Dec. 3, 2000),
http://www.crypto.com/papers/carnivore_report_comments.html.
213
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF EXIGENT
LETTERS AND OTHER INFORMAL REQUESTS FOR TELEPHONE RECORDS 46–47, 70 (Jan. 2010), available at
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/intel_oversight/IOB%202005-160.pdf.
214
Current law (such as UCC Article 2) and the wording of end-user license agreements (EULAs) make
this outcome unlikely. Note, though, that some computer worms have affected people who were not parties
to these agreements: the worms’ spread clogged the Internet sufficiently that other people could not use it.
See generally Jane Chong, We Need Strict Laws if We Want More Secure Software, New Republic (Oct. 30,
2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115402/sad-state-software-liability-law-bad-code-part-4.
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technical mechanisms to restrict an exploit to a given target machine. The simplest
mechanisms check various elements of their environment when they run, e.g., the
machine’s serial number or MAC address, and if they are on the wrong machine silently
exit. Stuxnet employed this technique. 215 A more sophisticated technique is to use
environmental data to construct a cryptographic key; if this data is not present, a key
cannot be constructed and the data will not decrypt properly, and the code will not be
comprehensible to any analyst. Gauss malware uses this technique, and has stymied top
cryptanalysts for months. 216
¶143
From one perspective, the part of the exploit that contains the vulnerability is the
most important piece, since knowledge of it will let people write their own exploit code.
The best defense against this is to use a dropper/payload architecture; that way, after the
initial penetration there is no further need for the vulnerability and the code relying on it
can be deleted. 217
¶144
Promiscuous spread of penetration tools also increases the risk of proliferation. The
more machines a piece of code is on, the more likely it is that someone will notice the
code and reverse-engineer it. This would expose not just a carefully husbanded
vulnerability, but also the surrounding infrastructure necessary to use it for lawful
intercepts. This calculus is similar to one found in the intelligence community: if one acts
on intelligence, one risks giving away the source of information, which would then be
unavailable in the future. 218
VI. REPORTING VULNERABILITIES
¶145

The CIPAV cases 219 demonstrate that the state employs vulnerabilities for
searches 220—the “can” problem—so we turn to the “may” problem: namely, may law
enforcement do so? 221 We have already argued that the security risks that would be
created by extending CALEA to IP-based communications make it a poor choice. In
contrast, if the vulnerability being used to introduce a wiretap already exists, the issue is
somewhat different, and the question instead concerns patching. If a vulnerability in a
communications application or infrastructure is patched, the vulnerability cannot be
exploited for a wiretap. But if the vulnerability is left unpatched, the result is that many
are left open to attack. Thus the issue is not about introducing an exploit, but about when,
and perhaps whether, to inform the vendor of the vulnerability.
See Stuxnet Dossier, supra footnote 17.
See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
217
The best analogy to a “dropper” is a lock pick. Once you’ve unlocked the door—i.e., once the
dropper has used a vulnerability to penetrate the system—you no longer need the lock pick; you can move
around freely inside the house. You can even open the door again, from the inside, to bring in new
materials, i.e., the “payload.”
218
See DAVID KAHN, THE CODE-BREAKERS (1967). The theme that if one acts on intelligence, one risks
giving away the source of the information, which will then be unavailable in the future pervades the book,
but the discussion of the assassination of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto on pgs. 595–601 is
especially illustrative.
219
See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text.
220
See Lynch, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
221
We are indebted to Marty Stansell-Gamm for the phrasing of the “may” versus “can” problem.
215
216
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What is law enforcement’s responsibility with regard to reporting? We start by
examining the security risks created by using vulnerabilities, then consider that risk in the
context of law enforcement’s role in crime prevention.
A.

Security Risks Created by Using Vulnerabilities

¶147

As we have already noted in Section V, there is a danger that even the most
carefully crafted exploitation tools may not function as intended. There are at least three
security concerns that must be weighed in choosing to use a vulnerability to conduct a
wiretap: (i) the risk that the vulnerability’s use will lead to overcollection, (ii) the danger
that the penetration tools may have unintended side effects on the targeted system, and
(iii) the danger that the vulnerability will accidentally escape its target device and find
use elsewhere. (This latter point is discussed in Section V.C, supra.)
¶148
Unfortunately there is much precedent for overcollection. Recent examples include
the NSA’s overcollection 222 as a result of the FISA Amendments Act 223 and the FBI’s
use of “exigent” letters to collect communications transactional data. 224 Use of the
vulnerabilities requires close scrutiny by judges to ensure that what is collected is only
what is authorized to be collected. Judges will therefore need to evaluate just how
intrusive a particular exploit may be, a technical as well as legal issue.
¶149
The wiretap statute requires that taps be done “with a minimum of interference”
with the service being monitored. 225 If an exploit causes other harm to the target
computer, such as damaging files or applications or leading to frequent crashes, use of the
exploit would violate this provision. At least one court has already quashed an
eavesdropping order on these grounds:
Looking at the language of the statute, the “a minimum of interference”
requirement certainly allows for some level of interference with customers’
service in the conducting of surveillance. We need not decide precisely how
much interference is permitted. “A minimum of interference” at least precludes
total incapacitation of a service while interception is in progress. Put another
way, eavesdropping is not performed with “a minimum of interference” if a
service is completely shut down as a result of the surveillance. 226

¶150

It is worth noting that in this case, there were no allegations of instances of the
customer trying and failing to use the service; however, use of the wiretap would make
the original service unavailable to the customer if requested. 227
A major concern was that the collection inappropriately included communications of Americans
without particularized FISA warrants. See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Extent of E-Mail
Surveillance Renews Concern in Congress, N. Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, at A1.
223
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, as amended by
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
224
The multiple problems included: (i) many of the exigent letters never received proper follow-up by
National Security Letters, (ii) sometimes private subscriber data was given to the FBI without a written
request, (iii) many of the exigent letter requests failed to specify a date, thus leading to a response that
included information well outside the intended investigatory period, (iv) many of the requests were not
related to an actual emergency, etc. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 213, at 257–72.
225
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2006).
226
Company v. United States, 349 F.3d 1132, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
227
Id. at 1134–35.
222
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Apart from legal considerations, it is worth noting that interference can lead to
discovery of the tap. This has happened at least twice in what appear to have been
intelligence operations. During a very sophisticated wiretap operation mounted against a
Greek cellphone operator, a bug in the attacking software caused some text messages not
to be delivered. The resulting error messages led to discovery of the implanted code. 228 In
a better-known case, the Stuxnet virus aimed at the Iranian nuclear centrifuge plant was
discovered when a computer user became suspicious and sent a computer to a Belarusian
antivirus firm for analysis. 229
B. Preventing Crime

¶152

The question of when to report vulnerabilities that are being exploited is not new
for the U.S government. In particular, the National Security Agency (NSA) has faced this
issue several times in its history, as we discuss below.
¶153
The NSA performs two missions for the U.S. government: the well-known mission
of signals intelligence, or SIGINT, which involves “reading other people’s mail,” 230 and
the lesser-known mission of communications security, COMSEC, which involves
protecting U.S. military and diplomatic communications. 231 In principle, it is extremely
useful to house the U.S. signals intelligence mission in the same agency as the U.S.
communications security mission because each is in a position to learn from the other.
SIGINT’s ability to penetrate certain communication channels could inform COMSEC’s
knowledge of potential weaknesses in our own and COMSEC’s awareness of security
problems in certain communications channels might inform SIGINT’s knowledge of a
target’s potential weakness.
¶154
Reality is in fact very different. COMSEC’s awareness of the need to secure certain
communications channels has often been thwarted by SIGINT’s desire that patching be
delayed so that it can continue to exploit traffic using the vulnerability in question. How
this contradictory situation is handled depends primarily on where the vulnerable
communications system is operating. If the insecure communications system is being
used largely in the U.S. and in smaller nations that are unlikely to harm the U.S., then
patching would not hurt the SIGINT mission. In that situation, COMSEC is allowed to
inform the vendor of the vulnerability. In most other instances, informing the vendor is
delayed so that SIGINT can continue harvesting product. Although this was never a
publicly stated NSA policy, this modus operandi was a fairly open secret. 232
¶155
Law enforcement operates in a different domain than the military, so its
considerations and values are different. The FBI’s concern that it is “going dark” is in
See Prevelakis & Spinellis, supra note 4.
See John Borland, A Four-Day Dive Into Stuxnet’s Heart, WIRED (Dec. 27, 2010, 8:27 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/a-four-day-dive-into-stuxnets-heart/.
230
Henry Stinson, the Secretary of State who shut down the “Black Chamber,” the Army’s signals
intelligence section during and after World War I, famously said, “Gentlemen do not read each other’s
mail.” His views changed during World War II when he was Secretary of War; the U.S. relied heavily on
signals intelligence during that conflict. Though the quote is attributed to Stinson, there is some evidence
that he was acting on President Hoover’s orders. See DAVID KAHN, THE READER OF GENTLEMEN’S MAIL:
HERBERT O. YARDLEY AND THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN CODEBREAKING (2004).
231
The COMSEC mission is performed by the NSA’s Information Assurance Division.
232
Interview with redacted source, Feb. 24, 2013, on file with author Susan Landau.
228
229

51

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

¶156

¶157

¶158

¶159

[2014

regard to domestic wiretapping; law enforcement wants to exploit the vulnerabilities
exactly when there are users in the U.S. Thus the balancing that NSA does between its
SIGINT and COMSEC missions does not particularly illuminate what the state of affairs
should be for the FBI. We must instead examine the issue from other vantage points.
One criterion that law enforcement should use is the likelihood of collateral damage
from using vulnerabilities. By their nature some vulnerabilities are easier to exploit than
others. More critically, some vulnerabilities are likely to be easier for law enforcement to
exploit than for the general population of attackers to do so. Any attack that is aided by
the ability to use compulsory legal process against a third party, such as an ISP, falls into
this category. In these cases, failure to report the vulnerability to the vendor is less likely
to have an effect on its exploitation by others.
There are also other factors that can make launching an exploit complicated, like
needing knowledge of special information or material about the target. If possession of
such knowledge or information is necessary for the vulnerability to be exploited, then law
enforcement can be fairly confident that there is little risk in not reporting the
vulnerability to the vendor.
In considering whether to report a vulnerability, law enforcement should consider
how dangerous a particular vulnerability may be. Sometimes this question will be very
easy to answer. If the vulnerability is in a network router or a switch, its impact is likely
to be very large. Indeed, vulnerabilities in network infrastructure are fundamentally a
national security risk because network devices are either ISP-grade gear, whose
compromise could be used to shut down or tap a large portion of the network; enterprise
gear, whose compromise could be used for targeted espionage attacks; or consumer gear,
likely to be in wide use and thus the compromise could effect a large population. Without
question, such vulnerabilities should be reported to the vendor immediately.
There are subtleties involved even if a vulnerability does not initially appear to be
one that could create a national security risk. If the vulnerability is for an uncommon
platform, it would seem that not informing the vendor of the problem is unlikely to create
much risk. If the vulnerability is for an outdated version of a platform, depending on how
outdated the platform is, the risk may also be relatively minor. 233 The latter is especially
true for devices that are replaced frequently, e.g., smart phones. Yet it is often the case
that outdated systems may be widely deployed in non-critical systems or even deployed
in critical systems, 234 so that a vulnerability that exists in an outdated version of a
platform may still be widely dangerous; it depends on exactly on who is using the
233
This issue makes for an interesting insight into pirated software. The fact that a high percentage of
software in China is illegally obtained has several implications for electronic surveillance. The most
significant implication is probably that the versions are not only out of date—e.g., as of January 2013, 62%
of Chinese Windows users had Windows XP installed, while 32% had Windows 7, StatCounter Global
Stats: Top 7 Operating Systems in China from Feb 2012 to Jan 2013, http://gs.statcounter.com/#os-CNmonthly-201202-201301 (last visited Feb. 17, 2013)—but also that they are less secure than more modern
systems. Thus, they are more open to exploitation.
234
One example of this is Windows XP; the eleven-year-old OS is still the most common operating
system in use at most government agencies. Shawn McCarthy, 8 Reasons Agency IT Will Change Course in
2013, GCN (Nov. 16, 2012) http://gcn.com/articles/2012/11/16/8-reasons-agency-it-will-change-course-in2013.aspx. Another is the backend system supporting voting machines in Ohio. PATRICK MCDANIEL ET
AL., EVEREST: EVALUATION AND TESTING OF ELECTION-RELATED EQUIPMENT, STANDARDS, AND
TESTING(Dec. 7, 2007), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/upload/everest/14AcademicFinalEVERESTReport.pdf
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platform and in what situation. This demonstrates the complexity of determining when
the vendor should be told about the vulnerability.
¶160
This raises the concern of whether the FBI will actually be able make an evaluation
of whether a vendor should be informed of a vulnerability. As the examples above show,
the ability to discern the potential risk from any particular vulnerability ranges from
relatively trivial to quite difficult. One limitation on the FBI’s ability to make an
evaluation is that the Domestic Communications Assistance Center (DCAC) does not
have the expertise to be a cybersecurity vulnerability research center. 235 Nor should it
have; that expertise lies with the NSA’s Information Assurance Directorate, and
duplicating the expertise is neither possible nor appropriate. Making such evaluations
requires vast knowledge about systems being employed in the U.S. across a wide array of
industries. Even a decade after September 11th, this information is not being tracked by
the U.S. government. The FBI is certainly not in a position to know this information, or
to be able to make the determination about how dangerous to the U.S. a particular
vulnerability may be.
¶161
The point is that except for some obvious cases, it is usually very difficult to
determine a priori whether a particular vulnerability is likely to create a serious problem.
236
It could be that some obscure, but critical part of society relies on the code with the
vulnerability. It could also be that it lies in some hidden part of the nation’s critical
infrastructure; for example, for decades American Airlines relied on old software for
planning flight operations. 237 Furthermore—and especially in an open-source world,
where it may be impossible to determine all the users of a system—there is no way that
law enforcement would be in a position to do a full mapping from software to users,
because there is no way to tell whom they all are.
¶162
As we alluded to earlier, this is a clash of competing social goods between the
security obtained by patching as quickly as possible and the security obtained by
downloading the exploit to enable the wiretap to convict the criminal. Although there are
no easy answers, we believe the answer is clear. In a world of great cybersecurity risk,
where each day brings a new headline of the potential for attacks on critical
infrastructure, 238 where the Deputy Secretary of Defense says that thefts of intellectual
property “may be the most significant cyberthreat that the United States will face over the
long term,” 239 public safety and national security are too critical to take risks and leave
vulnerabilities unreported and unpatched. We believe that law enforcement should
always err on the side of caution in deciding whether to refrain from informing a vendor
of a vulnerability. Any policy short of full and immediate reporting is simply inadequate.
See McCullagh, supra note 166.
A striking example of an obviously dangerous vulnerability occurred with the February 2013 USCERT alert concerning Java; the organization recommended disabling Java in web browsers until an
adequate patch had been prepared. Alert (TA13-032A): Oracle Java Multiple Vulnerabilities, US-CERT
(Feb. 1, 2013), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-032A.
237
Robert L. Mitchell & Johanna Ambrosio, From Build to Buy: American Airlines Changes
Modernization Course Midflight, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 2, 2013),
https://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9234936/From_build_to_buy_American_Airlines_changes_mod
ernization_course_midflight_.
238
See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Researchers Uncover Holes That Open Power Stations to Hacking, WIRED
(Oct. 16, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/10/ics/.
239
William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 100 (2010).
235
236
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“Report immediately” is the policy that any crime-prevention agency should have, even
though such an approach will occasionally hamper an investigation. 240
¶163
Note that a report immediately policy does not foreclose exploitation of the
reported vulnerability by law enforcement. Vulnerabilities reported to vendors do not
result in immediate patches; the time to patch varies with each vendor’s patch release
schedule (once per month, or once every six weeks is common), but, since vendors often
delay patches, 241 the lifetime of a vulnerability is often much longer. Research shows that
the average lifetime of a zero-day exploit is 312 days. 242 Furthermore, users frequently do
not patch their systems promptly, even when critical updates are available. 243
¶164
Immediate reporting to the vendor of vulnerabilities considered critical will result
in a shortened lifetime for particular operationalized exploits, but it will not prevent the
use of operationalized exploits. Instead, it will create a situation in which law
enforcement is both performing criminal investigations using the wiretaps enabled
through the exploits, and crime prevention through reporting the exploits to the vendor.
This is clearly a win/win situation.
240
There are persistent rumors that government agencies have sometimes pressured vendors to leave
holes unpatched. See, e.g., Graeme Burton, Microsoft Gives Zero-Day Vulnerabilities to US Security
Services - Bloomberg, COMPUTING (June 14, 2013),
http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2274993/microsoft-gives-zeroday-vulnerabilities-to-us-securityservices-bloomberg. This is a very dangerous path, one that should not be followed by law enforcement
agencies.
241
On the second Tuesday of every month, Microsoft issues patches both for software defects and
vulnerabilities. This date is known as “Patch Tuesday.” Vendors who use a 6-week “rapid-release cycle,”
such as Google (Chrome) and Mozilla (Firefox, Thunderbird), frequently roll their security patches into
their new releases. However, not all vulnerabilities discovered are patched in the next release. See, e.g.,
Tony Bradley, Patch Tuesday Leaves Internet Explorer Zero Day Untouched, PC WORLD (Apr. 9, 2013,
12:55 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2033649/patch-tuesday-leaves-internet-explorer-zero-dayuntouched.html; Michael Mimoso, Oracle Leaves Fix for Java SE Zero Day Until February Patch Update,
THREATPOST (Oct. 17, 2012, 2:41 PM), http://threatpost.com/oracle-leaves-fix-java-se-zero-day-untilfebruary-patch-update-101712/. Some vendors do issue patches considerably more rapidly; it is unclear,
though, that this is always a good idea. Rapid patches often block a particular path to reach the underlying
buggy code rather than repairing it. Accordingly, attackers often find new variants of the exploit without
much trouble. Sometimes patches contain their own flaws. Thus, there is likely an irreducible average
minimum time.
242
Zero-day vulnerabilities average a 10-month lifespan. Leyla Bilge & Tudor Dumitras, Before we
Knew It: An Empirical Study of Zero-day Attacks in The Real World, PROC. 2012 ACM CONF. ON
COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 833, 834 (2012).
243
There is a paucity of peer-reviewed research results on how soon individual users apply patches. The
best studies are old and apply to enterprise servers, not individual users. See, e.g., Eric Rescorla, Security
Holes... Who Cares?, PROC. 12TH USENIX SECURITY SYMP. 75, 75 (2003); CHESWICK, BELLOVIN &
RUBIN, supra note 151, at 74–75. Enterprises have their own needs and dynamics for patching, such as
concerns about compatibility with critical local software; furthermore, all system administration is
generally under the control of a centralized support group. Most wiretaps are of individuals, especially drug
dealers. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 53. Therefore, their behavior is likely very
different. There have been a number of statements by industry consistent with our assertion. See, e.g., Press
Release, Skype, Survey Finds Nearly Half of Consumers Fail to Upgrade Software Regularly and One
Quarter of Consumers Don’t Know Why to Update Software (July 23, 2012), available at
http://about.skype.com/press/2012/07/survey_finds_nearly_half_fail_to_upgrade.html. A recent study is
useful, since it measures actual exposure of real-world web browsers. How are Java Attacks Getting
Through?, WEBSENSE (Mar. 25, 2013, 9:01 PM),
http://community.websense.com/blogs/securitylabs/archive/2013/03/25/how-are-java-attacks-gettingthrough.aspx. Only about 5% of users had up-to-date Java versions, despite warnings of ongoing attacks.
Id. The best evidence, though, is empirical: the prevalence of attacks against holes for which patches are
available suggests that attackers still find them useful.
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It is interesting to ponder whether the policy of immediately reporting
vulnerabilities could disrupt the zero-day industry. Some members of the industry, such
as HP DVLabs, “will responsibly and promptly notify the appropriate product vendor of a
security flaw with their product(s) or service(s).” 244 Others, such as VUPEN, which
“reports all discovered vulnerabilities to the affected vendors under contract with
VUPEN,”245 do not. Although it would be a great benefit to security if the inability to
sell to law enforcement caused the sellers to actually change their course of action, U.S.
law enforcement is unlikely to have a major impact on the zero-day market since it is an
international market dominated by national security organizations.
C. A Default Obligation to Report

¶166

The tension between exploitation and reporting can be resolved if the government
follows both paths, actively reporting and working to fix even those vulnerabilities that it
uses to support wiretaps. As we noted, the reporting of vulnerabilities (to vendors and/or
to the public) does not preclude exploiting them. 246 Once a vulnerability is reported, there
is always a lead time before a “patch” can be engineered, and a further lead time before
this patch is deployed to and installed by future wiretap targets. Because there is an
effectively infinite supply of vulnerabilities in software platforms, 247 provided new
vulnerabilities are found at a rate that exceeds the rate at which they are repaired,
reporting vulnerabilities need not compromise the government’s ability to conduct
exploits. By always reporting, the government investigative mission is not placed in
244
See Disclosure Policy, ZERO DAY INITIATIVE,
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). It goes on to
say:

The first attempt at contact will be through any appropriate contacts or formal mechanisms
listed on the vendor Web site, or by sending an e-mail to security@, support@, info@, and
secure@company.com with the pertinent information about the vulnerability. Simultaneous
with the vendor being notified, DVLabs may distribute vulnerability protection filters to its
customers' IPS devices through the Digital Vaccine service.
If a vendor fails to acknowledge DVLabs initial notification within five business days,
DVLabs will initiate a second formal contact by a direct telephone call to a representative for
that vendor. If a vendor fails to respond after an additional five business days following the
second notification, DVLabs may rely on an intermediary to try to establish contact with the
vendor. If DVLabs exhausts all reasonable means in order to contact a vendor, then DVLabs
may issue a public advisory disclosing its findings fifteen business days after the initial
contact.
Id.

245
Vupen Security Research Team – Discovered Vulnerabilities in Prominent Software, VUPEN
SECURITY, http://www.vupen.com/english/research-vuln.php (last viewed Mar. 1, 2013) (emphasis added).
246
The question of publicly disclosing vulnerabilities is at the core of a very involved debate. The two
basic positions are "responsible disclosure", i.e., only to the vendor for a reasonable period (typically a few
months) or "full disclosure". Without going into details, the argument for full disclosure is threefold: first, it
has often been necessary to force the vendor to act; second, people have a right to know what risks they're
being exposed to (think of food labeling laws and many other product disclaimers); three, it lets individuals
and companies act to protect themselves until a vendor fix is available.
247
See BROOKS, supra note 116.
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conflict with its crime prevention mission. In fact, such a policy has the almost
paradoxical affect that the more active the law enforcement exploitation activity
becomes, the more zero-day vulnerabilities are reported to and repaired by vendors.
However, this does not mean that a law enforcement exploitation laboratory will be
naturally inclined to report the fruits of its labor to vendors. From the perspective of an
organization charged with developing exploits, reporting might seem an anathema to the
mission, since it means that the tools it develops will become obsolete more quickly.
Discovering and developing exploits costs money, and an activity that requires more
output would need a larger budget. 248
An obligation mandating that law enforcement agencies report any zero-day
vulnerabilities they intend to exploit should thus be supported by a strong legal
framework. Such a framework should create bright lines for what constitutes a
vulnerability that must be reported, when the reporting must occur, to whom the report
should be made, and which parts of the government are required to do the reporting.
There are many grey areas.
First, what should constitute a reportable vulnerability? Sometimes, this will be
obvious. For example, some software bugs, such as input validation errors, might allow
an attacker to take control over a piece of software. 249 Such behavior is clearly an error.
Once reported, the software vendor can easily repair the software to eliminate the
vulnerability and “push” the patch out. 250 Other vulnerabilities are less clearly the result
of specific bugs, however. Sometimes, a vulnerability results from overly powerful
software features that are behaving perfectly correct as far as the software specification is
concerned, but that allow an attacker to exploit them in unanticipated ways. For example,
many email systems allow software to be sent as an “attachment” that is executed on the
recipient’s computer when the user clicks on it. If an attacker emails a user malware and
the user is persuaded, however unwisely, to open it, the user’s computer becomes
compromised. Although it served as a vector for the malware, the email system software,
strictly speaking, has behaved correctly here. The line between a “bug” and a “feature” is
often quite thin.
Then there is the question of when a potential vulnerability that has been
discovered becomes “reportable.” Many vulnerabilities result from subtle interactions in
a particular implementation, 251 and not every software bug results in an actual exploitable
vulnerability. If the government is obligated to report exploitable vulnerabilities, when
must it do so? An appropriate guideline would be that once the government has
It is difficult to estimate precisely the cost of developing a particular vulnerability, but existing
markets can serve as a guide here, as discussed in Section IV.
249
See, e.g., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
250
Many companies, if not most, provide automatic security updates that are simply updated via
the Internet.
251
Quite some time ago, one of the authors of this paper discovered that someone working on an
important project was one of three people arrested in a hacking incident. (He eventually pled no contest.
One of the other two was convicted; the third was acquitted.) An audit of the code base was performed. The
team found one clear security hole, but log files showed it was an inadvertent hole coded, ironically, by one
of the other auditors. There were also two independent bugs, and the comments in the code for one of the
bugs did not agree with the code. Either bug alone was harmless; together, combined with a common
configuration mistake, they added up to a remote exploit. There was a plausible innocent explanation for
why the comments and the code did not match. It remains unclear if this was a deliberate back door or
a coincidence.
248

56

Vol. 12:1]

Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark, & Susan Landau

developed an exploit tool, the underlying vulnerability has been confirmed to be
exploitable and should promptly be reported. Note that this way of implementing the
always report policy gives law enforcement investigators some lead-time in using the
exploit tool. This approach provides appropriate leeway for law enforcement to do its job
by exploiting these vulnerabilities, while not making them quality assurance testers for
software companies.
¶171
To whom should a vulnerability report be made? In many cases, there is an obvious
point of contact: a software vendor that sells and maintains the product in question, or, in
the case of open-source software, the community team maintaining it. In other cases,
however, the answer is less clear. Not all software is actively maintained; there may be
“orphan” software without an active vendor or owner to report to. 252 Also, not all
vulnerabilities result from bugs in specific software products. For example, standard
communications protocols are occasionally found to have vulnerabilities, 253 and a given
protocol may be used in many different products and systems. In this situation, the
vulnerability would need to be reported not to a particular vendor, but to the standards
body responsible for the protocol. Many standards bodies operate entirely in the open,254
however, which can make quietly reporting a vulnerability—or hiding the fact that it has
been reported by a law enforcement agency—problematic. In this situation, the choice is
simple: report it openly.
¶172
Finally, there is the question of who in the government should be covered by
guidelines mandating reporting. In this paper, we are concerned specifically with a law
enforcement vulnerability lab. Should every U.S. government employee be included in
the guidelines? Or only those developing law enforcement surveillance tools? The vast
majority of government employees—even those who encounter security vulnerabilities—
are not directly involved in developing wiretapping tools. For example, there are
presumably system administrators in the Veterans Administration who occasionally
discover security vulnerabilities in the course of their work. Should they become legally
obligated to report? We propose that the reporting obligation be linked to the use of
vulnerabilities for law enforcement purposes. An ordinary system administrator who
discovers a vulnerability perhaps should report it, but the legal requirement should apply
only to those who employ such vulnerabilities to conduct communications intercepts.
VII.
¶173

EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ENFORCEMENT

When should reporting occur—at the time of discovery or purchase of the
vulnerability, or at the time of working exploit? Should there be exceptions to the
252
Every software system has a date beyond which there will be no further patches. Microsoft, for
example, lists its support plans at http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/products/lifecycle.
253
For example, several vulnerabilities have been found that allow attacks against systems using the
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, a widely used standard employed by many applications, including
Web browsers, printers, and email clients, for encrypting Internet connections. See, e.g., Dan Goodin,
Hackers Break SSL Encryption used by Millions of Sites, THE REGISTER (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/09/19/beast_exploits_paypal_ssl/.
254
For example, all Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) meetings and mailing lists are open to the
public. See the IETF website at www.ietf.org, and in particular The Tao of IETF: A Novice’s Guide to the
Internet Engineering Task Force, IETF § 4 (Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.ietf.org/tao.html.
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reporting rule in the case of an extremely important target, and how should that work? In
this section, we attempt to answer these questions as well as discuss the role of oversight.
A.
¶174
¶175

¶176

¶177

¶178

Enforcing Reporting

We advocate that vulnerabilities law enforcement seeks to exploit be reported by
default. There are a number of ways to implement and enforce such a policy.
The simplest way to implement a default reporting policy would be guidelines that
mandate reporting under certain circumstances promulgated by the administration, likely
the Department of Justice. 255 However, a guidelines-only approach has inherent
weaknesses. First, the guidelines would be formulated, implemented, and enforced by the
very department with the most interest in creating exceptions to the rule, and that most
“pays the cost” when the tools it develops and uses are neutralized. Such conflicts of
interest rarely end up with the strongest possible protections for the public.
Therefore, a legislative approach may be more appropriate. Perhaps as part of the
appropriations bill that funds the exploit discovery effort, Congress could mandate that
any vulnerabilities the unit discovers be reported; alternatively, a reporting mandate could
be added to the wiretap statute. This second approach has the advantage that it is more
permanent; however, amending the Wiretap Act has proven to be a long and contentious
process. Regardless, and as noted above, such legislation would need to be carefully
drafted to capture a range of different circumstances.
In the absence of a legislative fix, the best solution is for the judge authorizing the
use of the vulnerability to insert a reporting requirement into the warrant or order. This
provision could include a return date by which the requesting agency must certify that the
vendor had received appropriate notification. Apart from providing an enforcement
mechanism, this approach allows for careful consideration of specific circumstances,
including exceptional circumstances that might merit a delay. 256
Finally, one might imagine that the legislature could create a tort cause of action for
those harmed by a criminal exploitation of a vulnerability known to the government but
not reported. This would perhaps be the most radical approach to ensuring government
reporting, but it seems most unlikely. There is currently no obligation on anyone to report
vulnerabilities; for Congress to suddenly create government liability for non-reporting
seems improbable. 257 Our favored approach to ensure early government reporting of
vulnerabilities discovered is thus a simple but unambiguous legislative mandate that the
government report any zero-day vulnerabilities it seeks to exploit. We take no position
here on financial liability or other remedies should it fail to do so. 258
For example, the reporting requirement could be added to THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES
(2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf.
256
Exceptional circumstances are discussed in the following subsection.
257
Due in part to disclaimers in End User License Agreements (EULAs), there is in general no liability
even for vendors or developers of insecure software. See, e.g., Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors
of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425 (2008). However, the issue is a
frequent topic of academic discussion and the situation could conceivably change. In some situations, a site
operator can be held negligent. See, e.g., In re Heartland Payment Systems, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1047–48
(S.D. Tex. 2012).
258
We do not discuss or suggest remedies if the government fails to report vulnerabilities, as is urged in
this paper. A radical legislative approach could be to permit damages for those harmed by the exploitation
255
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B. Exceptions to the Reporting Rule
¶179

Although we have recommended that law enforcement report vulnerabilities upon
discovery (or purchase), there may be exceptional cases when immediate reporting is not
appropriate because immediate reporting of the vulnerability might lead to a target
patching and preventing installation of a wiretap. In what circumstances should not
reporting immediately be appropriate?
¶180
It is worth considering the principles employed in the closely related situation of
emergency wiretaps. Title III includes an exception allowing wiretaps to be used without
a warrant in emergency situations as long as a wiretap order is obtained within forty-eight
hours. 259 The law states that an emergency situation exists when there is immediate
danger of death or serious bodily injury, conspiratorial activities threatening national
security, or conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime, 260 but practice is
that warrantless wiretapping by law enforcement 261 is permitted only when there is an
immediate threat to life such as kidnapping and hostage-taking situations. 262 Emergency
wiretapping is not done lightly, and requires approval of someone of no rank lower than
an Associate Attorney General. Once the emergency wiretap is approved (approved, not
installed) law enforcement has forty-eight hours to obtain a wiretap order. 263
¶181
Assume a situation in which, using a wiretap warrant, law enforcement downloads
software to the target’s machine and finds that the target is running an unusual set of
programs, e.g., using the OpenBSD operating system with the Lynx web browser. 264 Law
enforcement lacks suitable tools for this particular setup. To exercise the actual wiretap,
law enforcement must find a vulnerability and operationalize it. Experience (with, e.g.,
the iPhone jailbreak efforts 265) suggests that in most cases, this will not take too long. If
the vulnerability is immediately reported as soon as it is acquired, law enforcement runs
the risk that the target’s device may be patched before the operationalized exploit
can be used.
of a zero-day vulnerability that was known to the government but that the government had not reported. A
more moderate approach could impose a reporting obligation on the government but disallow private
recovery of damages if it fails to do so.
259
18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (2006).
260
Id.
261
Note that we are discussing warrantless wiretaps for criminal investigations under Title III, not the
legalities of the Bush administration’s “terrorist surveillance” warrantless wiretapping program. See, e.g.,
Barton Gellman, Dafna Linzer & Carol D. Leonnig, Surveillance Net Yields Few Suspects, WASH. POST,
Feb. 5, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/04/AR2006020401373.html.
262
For a detailed discussion, see 9-7.112: Emergency Interception, U.S . ATT’YS MANUAL,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/7mcrm.htm#9-7.112 (last updated
July 2012).
263
18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (2006).
264
OpenBSD is an open-source operating system based on Unix (available at http://www.openbsd.org/)
and Lynx is a web browser (available at http://lynx.isc.org/). Because Lynx does not support graphics, it
cannot have web bugs, embedded objects that track usage, making it particularly privacy protective. Both
systems, which are relatively old by industry standards, continue to be developed, but neither has large
market share.
265
The best compendium of information on the history of iPhone jailbreaking is a Wikipedia page, iOS
Jailbreaking, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=IOS_jailbreaking&oldid=589152900
(last modified Jan. 4, 2014).
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As far as we know, the FBI has never reported any of the vulnerabilities used to
plant CIPAV. There is thus apparently no legal requirement that currently requires law
enforcement to report vulnerabilities, so we recommend a compromise. For public safety,
the law should require that law enforcement report vulnerabilities to the vendor once they
have been acquired or otherwise discovered, but there should also be an emergency
exception similar to that of Title III. We recommend that in an emergency situation, law
enforcement should have a forty-eight hour window past the usual reporting deadline in
which to petition a court for a release from reporting the vulnerability until it has
successfully installed a wiretap.
We expect that such a provision would rarely be invoked. First, most vulnerabilities
will have been discovered and reported by law enforcement, and the tools that exploit
them built and put in the arsenal for future use, well before there is any investigation that
might use them. For such tools, there is no emergency—or even any investigation—to
weigh against reporting at the time the vulnerability would be reported because any
situations in which a vulnerability is used would come up long after the vulnerability has
already been reported.
But there may be exceptional circumstances in which this pattern—vulnerabilities
discovered and tools developed well in advance of their being used by law
enforcement—is not followed. For example, we can imagine a very high-value organized
crime investigation in which a target might be using a particular and well-hardened, nonstandard platform for which no exploit tools are available in the “standard” arsenal. Law
enforcement might devote targeted resources toward discovering vulnerabilities and
developing tools for the specific devices used by the particular target. In such (likely very
rare) situations, the investigation and target might be known at the time some
vulnerability is discovered by law enforcement, and they might place a high priority on
preserving their ability to exploit it during the case.
The criteria for exemption must be as stringent as the Title III exemption. If
emergency wiretaps are permitted only when there is imminent danger of death (e.g., a
kidnapping or hostage-taking situation) then the situation for emergency use of a
vulnerability without reporting must be equally dire.
Another issue with emergency use is that the vulnerability must be such that there
is a low risk of serious harm resulting from its exploitation by others against innocent
persons. As we have discussed, estimating such risk is quite difficult. Given the
importance of preventing crime, the decision not to report must not be made lightly. The
petition not to report must include not only an argument for the importance of the
interception, but also an analysis of the harm that could be caused should the
vulnerability be discovered and exploited by others during the period that law
enforcement is operationalizing the tool. In weighing whether to delay reporting a
vulnerability, the court should consider how likely it is that the vulnerability, having been
discovered, can actually be exploited, and the damage that may result from such
exploitation.
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C. Providing Oversight
¶187

There is potential danger that an operationalized exploit may proliferate past its
intended target. Stuxnet 266 provides an interesting case in point. Although aimed at Iran,
the malware spread to computers in other countries, including India and Indonesia. 267 It is
unclear from the public record how this happened. It may have been due to a flaw in the
code, as Sanger contends; 268 alternatively, it may have been foreseeable but unavoidable
collateral damage from the means chosen to launch the attack against Iran. Either
possibility, though, represents a process that may be acceptable for a military or
intelligence operation but is unacceptable for law enforcement. Only the legally
authorized target should be put at risk from the malware used.
¶188
Given the public policy issues raised by the use of vulnerabilities, it would be
appropriate to have public accountability on the use of this technique. For example,
annual reports on vulnerability use similar to the AO’s Wiretap Reports, presenting such
data as: How many vulnerabilities were used by law enforcement in a given year? Were
they used by federal or state and local? Was the vulnerability subsequently patched by the
vendor, and how quickly after being reported? Was the vulnerability used by anyone
outside of law enforcement? Was the vulnerability exploited outside law enforcement
during the period that law enforcement was aware of the problem but had not yet told the
vendor? Did the operationalized vulnerability spread past its intended target? What
damages occurred from its exploitation? Making such information open to public analysis
should aid in decisions about the right balance between efficacy and public safety. 269
D. Regulating Vulnerabilities and Exploitation Tools

¶189

As we have mentioned, even without considering its use by law enforcement,
information about software vulnerabilities is inherently “dual use”—useful for both
offense and defense. Related to the issue of reporting and proliferation is the question of
how the law should treat information about vulnerabilities and the development of
software tools that exploit them by non-law enforcement persons. Should information
about vulnerabilities, and tools that exploit them, be restricted by law? How do existing
statutes treat such information and tools?
¶190
The issue of how to handle such dual-use technologies is not new. The computer
security community has grappled for years with the problem of discouraging illicit
exploitation of newly discovered vulnerabilities by criminals while at the same time
See Stuxnet Dossier, supra note 17.
DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND SURPRISING USE OF
AMERICAN POWER 203–05 (2013).
268
Id. Sanger’s conclusion is somewhat controversial. See Steven Cherry, Stuxnet: Leaks or Lies?, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Sept. 4, 2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/podcast/computing/embedded-systems/stuxnet-leaksor-lies.
269
The same is true regarding data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts’ Wiretap Reports
(available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/WiretapReports/WiretapReports_Archive.aspx). For
example, one of the authors of the present paper used Wiretap Report data to show that FBI claims about
the importance of wiretaps to solve kidnappings was incorrect. Between 1969 and 1994 wiretaps were used
in only two to three kidnappings a year (out of 450 kidnappings annually). DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note
21, at 211.
266
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allowing legitimate users and researchers to learn about the latest threats, in part to
develop effective defenses. 270 It is all but impossible to prevent information about
vulnerabilities or software exploits that use them from getting in to the hands of criminals
without hampering efforts at defense. On the one hand, information about zero-day
vulnerabilities is coveted by criminals who seek unauthorized and illicit access to the
computers of others. But the same zero-day information is also used, and sought out by,
legitimate security researchers and computer scientists who are engaged in building
defenses against attack and in analyzing the security of new and existing
systems and software.
¶191
Even software tools that exploit vulnerabilities are inherently dual use. They can be
used by criminals on the one hand, but are also useful to defenders and researchers. For
example, computer and network system administrators routinely use tools that attempt to
exploit vulnerabilities to test the security of their own systems and to verify that their
defenses are effective. Researchers who discover new security vulnerabilities or attack
methods often develop “proof of concept” attack software to test and demonstrate the
methods they are studying. It is not unusual for software that demonstrates a new attack
method to be published and otherwise made freely available by academics and other
researchers. Such software is quite mainstream in the computer science
research community. 271
¶192
The software used by malicious, criminal attackers to exploit vulnerabilities can
thus be very difficult to meaningfully distinguish from mainstream, legitimate security
research and testing tools. It is a matter of context and intent rather than attack
capabilities per se, and current law appears to reflect this.
¶193
Current wiretap law does not generally regulate inherently dual-use technology.
The provision of Title III concerned with wiretapping equipment, 18 USC § 2512,
generally prohibits possession and trafficking in devices that are “primarily useful” for
“surreptitious interception” of communications, 272 which does not appear to apply to a
270
The question of the ethics of publishing vulnerability information far antedates computers. In 1857,
Alfred Hobbs, in Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Door Locks, wrote,“A commercial, and in
some respects a social, doubt has been started within the last year or two, whether or not it is right to
discuss so openly the security or insecurity of locks. Many well-meaning persons suppose that the
discussion respecting the means for baffling the supposed safety of locks offers a premium for dishonesty,
by showing others how to be dishonest. This is a fallacy. Rogues are very keen in their profession, and
already know much more than we can teach them respecting their several kinds of roguery.”
271
Many security software packages that might appear to be criminal attack tools are actually designed
for legitimate research and testing. For example, the Metasploit package (available at http://metasploit.com)
is a regularly updated library of software that attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities in various operating
systems and applications. Although it may appear at first glance to be aimed at criminals, it is actually
intended for (and widely used by) system administrators and professional “penetration testers” to identify
weaknesses that should be repaired in their systems.
272
18 USC § 2512(1) (2006) provides criminal penalties for any person not otherwise authorized who:
(a) sends through the mail, or sends or carries in interstate or foreign commerce, any
electronic, mechanical, or other device, knowing or having reason to know that the design of
such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of
wire, oral, or electronic communications;
(b) manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells any electronic, mechanical, or other device,
knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful
for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications,
and that such device or any component thereof has been or will be sent through the mail or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or

62

Vol. 12:1]

Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark, & Susan Landau

wide range of current software exploit tools developed and used by researchers. We
believe this is as it should be. The security research community depends on the open
availability of software tools that can test and analyze software vulnerabilities.
Prohibiting such software generally would have a deleterious effect on progress in
understanding how to build more secure systems, and on the ability for users to determine
whether their systems are vulnerable to known attacks. In addition, we note that given
that the majority of vulnerability markets are outside the U.S., and that national security
agencies are heavy purchasers of these vulnerabilities, 273 regulating them is not a
plausible option.
¶194
The specialized tools developed by law enforcement to collect and exfiltrate
evidence from targets’ computers, however, might fall more comfortably under the scope
of 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (2006) as it is currently written. These tools would not be developed
to aid research or test systems, but rather to accomplish a law enforcement interception
goal. They would have narrowly focused features designed to make their installation
surreptitious and their ongoing operation difficult to detect. They would also have
features designed to identify and collect specific data, and would have no alternative use
outside the surreptitious interception application for which they were developed. Such
tools, unlike those used by researchers, could more easily meet section 2512’s test of
being “primarily useful” for “surreptitious interception,” and thus would be unlawful if
someone “manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells” them except under the
circumstances spelled out in that section.
VIII.
¶195

CONCLUSION

Changes in telecommunications technologies led to the 1994 passage of CALEA.
However, CALEA created problems because of software complexity and the fact that it
introduces a security vulnerability. Due to further—and quite extraordinary—changes in
the communications technologies since CALEA’s passage, the law enforcement
wiretapping capabilities the law engendered are now in danger of failing; to prevent this,
law enforcement now seeks to expand the CALEA regime to IP-based communications.
As we have discussed, the changes in communications technologies since 1994 not only
undermine the present version of CALEA, they make extending the CALEA model to
modern communications systems highly problematic, creating serious security risks.

(c) places in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication or disseminates by
electronic means any advertisement of—
(i) any electronic, mechanical, or other device knowing the content of the
advertisement and knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device
renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications; or
(ii) any other electronic, mechanical, or other device, where such advertisement
promotes the use of such device for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of
wire, oral, or electronic communications, knowing the content of the advertisement
and knowing or having reason to know that such advertisement will be sent through
the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce . . . .
273
Greenberg, supra note 185.
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Nonetheless, there needs to be a way for law enforcement to execute authorized
wiretaps. The solution is remarkably simple. Instead of introducing new vulnerabilities to
communications networks and applications, law enforcement should use vulnerabilities
already present in the target’s communications device to wiretap in the situations where
wiretapping is difficult to achieve by other means.
The exploitation of existing vulnerabilities to accomplish legally authorized
wiretapping creates uncomfortable issues. Yet we believe the technique is preferable for
conducting wiretaps against targets when compared to other possible methods of
wiretapping, like deliberately building vulnerabilities into the network or device, would
result in less security.
We propose specific policies to limit the potential damage of using existing
vulnerabilities. First, we recommend that in order to prevent rediscovery of the
vulnerability and hence proliferation of the exploit, technical defenses should be
implemented. Second, we recommend that, with rare exceptions, law enforcement should
report vulnerabilities on discovery or purchase. This means our proposal may actually
have the benefit of increasing security generally. Finally, because the exploit may allow
far greater penetrations of the target device than would be permitted by a mere wiretap,
we urge guidelines to ensure that law enforcement bar use of any other information found
on the computer during the exploit (unless permitted by an additional warrant).
There is a critical difference in the societal dangers entailed in the use of targeted
vulnerabilities compared with the installation of global wiretapping capabilities in the
infrastructure. If abused, targeted vulnerability exploitation, like wiretapping in general,
has the potential to do serious harm to those subjected to it. But it is significantly more
difficult—more labor intensive, more expensive, and more logistically complex—to
conduct targeted exploitation operations against all members of a large population. In
other words, although vulnerability exploitation is very likely to be effective against any
given target, it is difficult to abuse at large scale or in an automated fashion against
everyone. Thus our solution provides better security than extending the model of CALEA
to IP-based communications would.
Vulnerability exploitation has more than a whiff of dirty play about it; who wants
law enforcement to be developing and using malware to break into users’ machines? We
agree that this proposal is disturbing. But as long as wiretaps remain an authorized
investigatory tool, law enforcement will press for ways to accomplish electronic
surveillance even in the face of communications technologies that make it very difficult.
We are at a crossroads where the choices are to reduce everyone’s security or to enable
law enforcement to do its job through a method that appears questionable but that does
not actually make us less secure. In this debate, our proposal provides a clear win for both
innovation and security.
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